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Abstract  
With the ever-increasing growth of network resources, a great number of organizations are extremely 
dependent on the internet for operational activities as such, exposing their sensitive and confidential 
information to intrusion or invasion by saboteurs and corporate theft leaving them exposed and vulnerable. 
This revolution has led to the fast and emerging growth of malware with high complexity which 
circumnavigates a lot of security asset to keep safe sensitive organizational data. The development of these 
complex malware has become a big threat in today’s computing world such as Advanced Persistent Threats 
(APTs). APTs is customized for a specific target and can be subtly altered to avoid detection. In that, APTs 
attack is considered as a serious problem whose devastating effects cannot be overemphasized. 
To combat this propagate, malware analysers have been deployed in Machine Learning and Data Mining 
techniques or the combination of both techniques to automatically spot malicious file. A lot of feature 
engineering approaches are explored to improve the performance of detection/classification system if 
feature engineering approach provides sufficient information of malware type for clustering purposes, then 
this indicates the possibility of developing learning method which performs better. In fact, there are 
motivations for incorporating feature selection in data classification employed on data from a machine 
learning perspective.   The main focus of this research is on static analysis approach. To find the dominated 
features in one malware family, an experimentation with the association, link analysis, and segmentation 
algorithms are employed. The model performs on a publicly available dataset on Kaggle and GitHub. The 
experimental data gave supportive validation of the proposed feature selection model by Gaussian Mixer 
Model in R environment. 
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                  Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Overview 
This chapter presents the introductory part of the research which includes the background of the study and 
the other important keys pathways to give a general overview of the research work. It is categorised into 
various sub-section presented sequentially as follow: 
1.1 Background 
Malware is a malicious program that is intentionally developed to harm computer systems(Sharma and 
Sahay, 2016).The emerging growth of malware with high complexity has opened doors to a confidential 
and sensitive data breach by hackers on a daily bases. This can circumnavigate a lot of security asset set 
up to mask or keep safe sensitive organisational data. A big threat in today’s cybersecurity era, the variant 
of complicated malware mutates their code by crafting to look different from each other even from the 
same malicious family to evade detection system. Finding samples of all the new advanced malware from 
different groups created every day is a big challenge. Although, creating new signatures and getting them 
deployed effectively is an even bigger one.  
Cyberspace is a highly dynamic man-made domain with a high degree of uncertainty and incomplete data 
which must be transformed into knowledge to support precise and predictable cyber risk. Therefore, to 
combat malware effectively, it is desirable to identify the type of malware with strong structural similarities 
or dissimilarities. Technically, if an unseen malware crafted by some of the examined patterns; it is possible 
to detect suspicious file on the host in the real-time.  As a result, this type of detectability can formalize 
cyber asset. 
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A sophisticated malicious program, like APTs campaign, generates a unique, new instance of a malware 
family for each victim, to create a new way of attack. One challenge faced by IT security teams is how to 
spot signs of an advanced malware.  Static, dynamic analysis or combination of both techniques equip 
them to spot data exfiltration occurrence. APTs are particularly dangerous for enterprises, as hackers have 
ongoing access to sensitive company data. To skip pattern matching detection technique, malware creators 
employ several sophisticated obfuscation mechanisms to ensure they can break into systems. Obfuscation 
techniques preserve the program‘s semantic and functionality while, at the same time, make it harder to 
understand or read the program’s structure such as packing, polymorphism, and metamorphism. In which 
case, the signature-based detection techniques fail while dynamic-based detections are mainly time-
consuming according to (Fraley, 2016) (Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2016). One possible solution to this 
is to automatically classify malware types and assign those families in relation to opcodes similarities or 
dissimilarities factors. In this case, feature selection techniques will come to the picture. Feature selection 
is widely used so that a set of relevant features can be chosen without searching for all possible subsets 
according to certain relevance evaluation criteria. 
By considering the fact that malware writers change malware appearance on each infection, though; they 
design functionally equivalent (Kaur and Singh, 2014) (Mathur, 2013). Matching instruction syllable into 
pre-exciting groups and identify their respective malware families becomes a potential solution.  Thereby, 
the concept pattern discovery techniques have been utilized by cybersecurity researchers likewise in the 
health system for cancer detection and prediction. Discovering frequent sequential patterns and measuring 
the dissimilarity and similarity between discovered patterns have been studied by researchers (Ding et al., 
2014) (Fan et al., 2016). Monitoring the opcode instructions of different malware groups and present opcode 
relationships by segment analysis is examined in this research. 
In order to create an abstract description of each malware family; there is a need for a comprehensive study 
which consists of several stages. The first stage is data preparation. Data preparation in current research 
includes: collecting malware sample files, reversing the samples code, creating raw opcode dataset. To 
create the virus code extracted from variants of the same malware family as a raw dataset. To complete 
data preparation, the network between extracted instruction syllables from each individual malware type 
is generated. The generated graphs present features in the secondary datasets. The feature is an individual 
measurable property of a malware opcode being observed. The number of features will be used is called 
the dimension. Assessment of link Analysis results is done by data segmentation. Data segmentation 
captured the commonalities of all features within a group. It also explains how the variable and variable 
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levels contribute to the formation of clusters. Important variables are identified by segmentation analysis 
and the performance of its clustering will be evaluated by Expectation-Maximization algorithm. 
On this assumption and motivation, a new feature selection model is developed. The proposed model not 
only to discover relationship and links between code instructions but also effectively regroup malware 
types to the respective family. The experimental evaluation in this research was designed to be much more 
thorough to pave the way toward deployment of the approach for use by cyber-security analysts.  
As far as this research is concerned, this study is the first to establish a model based on link analysis and 
clustering to categorize malicious families. While there have been promising results on the usage of data 
mining and unsupervised learning techniques on data classification problems (Siddequi, Wang and Lee, 
2008) (Ucci, Aniello and Baldoni, 2017) (Das et al., 2016) (Liu, Li and Zhao, 2003) (Bernardi et al., 
2017)(V.SHARMILA, I.VASUDEVAN and 1ASSOCIATE, 2014)(Ding et al., 2014)(Ge, Wang and Xu, 
2016) (Mohaisen, Alrawi and Mohaisen, 2015)(Pai et al., 2016). 
1.2 Research Problem 
There is a large amount of variously complicated malware and it is insufficient to compare them only as 
a single class against the signature repository. The intention of crackers is to reuse the previous chunk of 
codes, for instance, well-known loop performing infection. Therefore, while the main functionality of a 
malware sample remains immutable during its mutation. Malware types can be merged into groups of 
malware family with common functionality which is called malware families.  
 By knowing that ,frequent functions are used, the probability to trace the previous family based on the 
instruction parcel commonalities have been studied by security researchers (Le, Zincir-Heywood and 
Heywood, 2017)(Yewale and Singh, 2017)(Scott, Fellow and Technology, 2017)(Ye, 2017)(Deka, Sarma 
and Panicker, 2017)(Mohammadi and Hamzeh, 2017). However, code instruction commonalities come at 
the cost of an exponential increase in the dimensionality of the resulting feature vectors, required storage 
and computation time. Hence, previous work that uses opcode mining approach commonly chose small 
instruction parcel. 
Part of the challenge in finding commonalities among samples is feature extraction/construction. The 
process of finding the most relevant features for each malware family is feature selection. Further yet 
which ones belong together as part of an attack is akin to finding needles in a huge haystack let alone to 
figure out which ones belong to the same knitting set. 
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The art of evaluating which subsets of codes is significant for detection purpose is still under 
investigation. Besides, which feature selection methods perform better on prediction model while 
alleviating dimensionality is another challenge to be addressed. Finding the most effective features and 
decreasing the computational load in cluttered scenes is another area that needs further perusal. The results 
of an efficient feature selection system could mean a substantial saving in terms of time for data collection 
and space for future data storage. There are many advantages of feature selection for malware detection; 
however, little effort has been devoted, until now, to apply feature selection methods of machine learning 
to deal with malware redundant and irrelevant features. 
To remedy this situation, extracted feature compress by feature selection methods to produce a more 
normal distribution prior to clustering. Feature selection and classification accuracy for malware detection 
vastly have been investigated (Ahmadi and Giacinto, 2015)(Deepa, Radhamani and Vinod, 
2015)(Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014). Classification analysis will both describe the separation 
between groups and assign new malware to a known group based on a list of selected features (Poulsen, 
2013). 
This will result in models that will produce a better fit. For clustering malware family’s samples, many 
approaches are published. Different similarity measures are examined but without thoroughly discussing 
their choice on dissimilarity or link of structure code. For the purpose of identifying malicious families, it 
is needed to extract the pattern necessary for its detection. The complex malware samples that are similar 
to each other are grouped into the same cluster (Canfora et al., 2015). Each cluster is characterized by a 
membership function with statistical mean and deviation. The extracted feature, corresponding to a cluster, 
is weighted and contained in the cluster. The dataset is grouped into clusters, based on similarity of the 
opcode. Reactions to cyber threats based on what has already been found are limited by the victim of APT 
attacks(Thomson, 2011).  
1.3 Research Hypothesis  
On this assumption and motivation, a new model in this thesis will be developed to combine static 
analysis, association rules and a clustering method. The outcome could be used to train a classifier over a 
decent size dataset to provide robustness against new unseen malware. If an unknown complex malware 
uses all or some of the same functionalities as are used by the training dataset then it is possible to detect 
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this unseen malware. Based on the investigation, the following questions are considered in the research to 
figure out an effective method to a group known malware samples. 
1.4 Research Questions  
In this research, data mining method was used to identify groups of opcode patterns that are highly 
correlated with each other in a family. The following three research questions that reflect the main topics 
of the research have identified. 
1. How can advanced malware opcode structures be characterized based on similarity? 
It is logical to assume that different malware families will contain a different kind of functions code. 
The majority of current methods for measuring opcode similarity collect only frequency and sequential 
patterns. This may be a great way to classify malware, but it doesn’t tell much about significant patterns. 
This would be comprehensive enough to identify a malware sample into the respective family. Thus, 
methods of feature engineering for providing the most informative features is needed to be explore. 
2. How can link analysis and segmentation techniques be utilized for malware classification? 
The second research question is focused on research into analyse opcode link for segmentation. By 
selecting rules with higher lift value and significant odds ratios, and considered individual each 
observation matched these rules will form a malware group. Our study adds to the growing body of 
research exploring the association between malware samples in a family.  
3. How to select a smaller number of variables from a large pool of opcode structures as input variables, 
reducing the dimensionality of data for building better mode? 
To define groups of malware samples with similar opcode links, the segmentation results in present 
similarity, distance, and distance metrics. 
2. What possibilities does the similarity opcode analysis have for detecting advance malware?  
The main goal of the third research question is to explore the benefits of the proposed method for 
feature engineering in detecting advanced malware. We will pay attention to the verification of different 
characteristics of similarity opcodes and to the various representation of malware families. Specifically, 
we will focus on different functions to measure the pattern distances and the identification of each group 
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based on the opcode graph. To build a predictive model for malware detection, segmentation results can 
be utilized. 
1.5 Research Motivation 
The present study designed to investigate the prevalence and patterns of opcode structures discriminate 
the similarity of each frame to malware groups in a cluster. Unsupervised learning techniques are applied 
to the execution traces, with the aim being to create a predictive model which can accurately and speedily 
differentiate between malware families. The motivation behind this research is shaped based on the 
proposed method by (Liu et al., 2017)and (Hu et al., 2013) for detecting variants malware with an opcode-
based feature into clusters. Authors proposed a fast density-based clustering technique. Their experiment 
tackled feature selection and data dimension reduction, computational power, and storage required to find. 
Besides, the limitation that only convex decision regions are allowed is considered in their proposed 
method. Conversely from the research carried out during the course of this work, there is relatively limited 
research in literature concerned with the similarity between two groups of advanced malware. Therefore, 
this study aims to experimentally investigate the advance malware similarities and differences for attack 
indication purpose based on association rule mining. 
1.6 Research Challenges 
The potential challenge collated from the extensive literature review and preliminary investigations is 
classifying the various given potential advanced malware binary codes into various pattern features for 
clustering purpose. Thus, the challenge is to select a relevant set of features, so that, the classification model 
can be built in less time with high accuracy. Tackling this challenge will involve discovering malware 
signature by analysing and observing the patterns in the assembly level instructions of various x86 binary 
malware executables. Prioritize limited APTs malware resources is consider another difficult task of this 
research.  
1.7 Justification, Aims, and Objectives  
In this research, a comprehensive and robust approach will be used to understand and assess the 
mechanisms and factors that affect the efficiency of clustering. 
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1.8 Research Aims 
•    The primary goal of this research is performing similarity measures between different malware 
families for the same variant utilizing data mining concepts in conjunction with unsupervised algorithms.  
•    The secondary goal of this research is to evaluate unsupervised algorithms towards automated 
clustering of advanced malware into various groups accordingly. 
1.9 Research Objectives  
Through experimental and numerical simulation, the key objectives are listed below: 
I. Study the evolution and current state of classification methods for advanced, as well as 
recent progress made to analyse and detect sophisticated obfuscated malwares families. 
II. Develop static analysis to enable the detection of sophisticated obfuscated malwares 
III. Data exploration using association mining, sequential pattern mining, relevance feature 
discovery on clustering 
IV. Enhance the unknown pattern discovery to reduce the side effects of noisy patterns, low 
frequency problem. 
V. Develop a technique aiming at better analysing malware opcode with particular emphasis 
on evaluating features to reduce the dimensionality of high dimensional opcode vector. 
VI. Facilitate the categorization of complex malware by measuring the link instructions in 
order to improve the previous detection coverage. 
To meet the research objectives: detectable patterns of opcode instructions firstly are discovered and then 
the most relevant of them within each family is uncovered. Afterwards, a collection of the most important 
predictor variables is ready for training purpose in classification technique. Specifically, objective III and 
IV can be achieved by usage of association rules mining and examining clustering techniques. Link 
analysis is the data mining technique that addresses this need. This model is used to generate data for future 
data-driven decision making on the multinomial dataset. The models are designed in SAS® Enterprise 
Miner. When all variables generated by link analysis have been fed into the segmentation node a desired 
number of clusters are formed automatically. As a result, important variables for each cluster will be 
retrieved. The validation partition is set aside and is used to test the accuracy and fine tune model. 
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1.10 Significant of the Study  
The uniqueness of this study exists in dealing with uncertain labels and a reduction in the volume of 
features to mitigate misclassification. Hence it enables the introduction of link analysis in malware features 
construction for clustering purpose. This is in line with multiple interpretations conveyed by frequent 
sequential opcode patterns, which help to indicate zero-day attacks on the whole systems. Such a combined 
approach could leverage the relative strengths of classification to yield a stronger overall detector in terms 
of detection rate and speed. The strategy of considering multiple aspects to compare samples can leverage 
different facets of the malware, improve the overall classification rate, and potentially improve the 
robustness of performance. 
1.11 Research Scope and Limitations 
The proposed approach is presented under the following limitations: 
 Due to time constraints, the ability to collect large datasets of malware samples from APTs groups 
was somewhat limited. However, the number of malware samples selected was arbitrary and the 
final 250 files were fully populated from a data completeness perspective. 
 Fast-paced malware sample, will the datasets being used for the experiment will be questioned. 
 Last resort, stick to the existing database, to free from any specific malware family to make sure 
the method will/could work with incoming, new malware. 
Needless to say, for research purposed these issues are always wondered.  
1.12 Research Methodology and Research Methods 
Academic research is defined as the art of scientific investigation which aims to investigate the unknown 
knowledge. This chapter provides a detailed description of how the research is to be carried out. 
1.12.1 Research Methodology  
Research methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem. The nature of academic research requires 
a different kind of steps which is listed below: 
 Problem discovery and research questions  
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 Formulation research  problems and objectives  
 Research design   
 Literature survey and reference collection 
 Assessment of the current status of the topic chosen 
 Sampling plan and data analysis 
 Interpretation of results  
 Experiment report 
These steps are depicted in Figure 1-1-2 and research architecture is illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1Research Architecture 
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1.12.2 Research Methods 
In order to get a solution to a problem research methods is concreated. The results are presented in tables 
and graphs. Once data of each case study are collected. Association rule mining applied to analyse patterns 
of malware family based on opcode graph.  
In this case, a proper representation of each malware family will be pulled out. Hereafter, link analysis 
measurement will be run. Building segmentation analysis places observations into groups according to the 
natural association between the observations. The overview of the methodology is demonstrated in chapter 
3 section 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1-2Research Methodology Flow 
 
Meet the Research 
Objectives  
No 
Yes 
Problem Discovery  Research Questions 
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Report the effectiveness and            
efficiency of work 
Design Research Method 
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1.13 Research Overview and Structure  
This research presents a three-stage method to cluster malware into a group by comparing their opcode 
similarities to existing static traces and assigning it to the most similar group. First creating a shortlist of 
samples malware from different families. The second stage opcode extraction in order to estimate their 
similarity/dissimilarity distance between opcode. Finally k-means, hieratical, and pam clustering is run 
base on the combination of opcode interaction to find out which sample belongs to which family. A set of 
code influencers and aggregates them based on how close they are to each other is filtered. The results 
demonstrate that the proposed model provides useful clustering variables by segment analysis technique. 
This research is organized as follow chapter one provide an introduction to the research gap and problem. 
An overview of the most important previous works based on machine learning and data mining discusses 
in chapter two. The proposed method in more detail and stating the detect mechanism is described in 
chapter three. The details the techniques discussed in this chapter too. Chapter four provided more 
information about research case studies and experiment. Chapter five presents the examination of results. 
Finally, chapter six wraps the whole thesis up by giving a conclusion. The recommendation and future 
work stated in the same chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Related Literature Review 
2 Overview  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, this research presented malware classification that integrated 
the static analysis of malware with a data mining system using association rule and clustering techniques. 
Relevant background material related to malware classification and detection techniques specific to 
distinguish malware families is studied extensively. Furthermore, several existing zero-day sophisticated 
malware detection techniques are surveyed. In this section, a brief overview of the several topics that are 
relevant to the research aims is discussed. First, malware definition followed by APTs is considered. Then, 
malware analysis and ML in general, with emphasis on data mining techniques. It is followed by the 
discussion on Link Analysis and its potential role in malware detection, summarized by key findings. 
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to review the state of the art literature on the above-mentioned 
topics in such a way that rationalise their connections to the proposed research hypothesis. 
2.1 Characterisation of Malware  
Maliciousness is defined as the risks exposed to users, computers, networks or infrastructures -such as 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, rootkits, (Yewale and Singh, 2017).  Evidently, a malicious code scans for 
vulnerabilities of a host or network target. Once the malware finds a way to enter the system, takes control 
of it and it performs silently some unauthorized action, gathering sensitive information and etc.  Sometimes 
the tension of a virus is not to cause damage, but to clone itself onto another host. The virus causes damage 
it is more likely to be detected. On the other hand, advanced malware with a very small footprint could 
remain undetected for a very long time (Shenwen, Yingbo, and Xiongjie, 2015). 
There is unstoppable growth in the number and variant of attacks that lies on the continuous generation of 
refined and aggressive malicious code (Azmoodeh et al., 2018). Malware can be classified into different 
categories based on their intent. Table 2-1  presents their capabilities as stated by (Gharacheh et al., 2016) 
(Deka, Sarma and Panicker, 2017) (Sharma and K. Sahay, 2014) (Fraley, 2016) (Thunga and Neelisetti, 
2015). 
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Table 2-1Malware Variant 
 Capabilities Way of Defence 
 
Malware 
variant  
 Able to replicates by inserting itself into other programs 
 Able to gain access to the private system  
 Able to disrupt a computer system  
 Able to gather sensitive information  
 
 Anti-virus  
  Able to skip traditional signature-based defences 
 Able to bypass inefficient security solutions.  
 Able to detects a VM environment and to hide and not 
perform malicious behaviour  
 Sandbox  
 Firewall 
Although any specific malware has its own capability; the internal state of malicious software remains the 
same. Since it is difficult to create a new virus from scratch; usually, malware writers reuse old virus. 
However, to hide detection the hacktivists they tend to change the obfuscations (syntax) more than the 
behaviour (semantic) of any specific malware. To be seen, malware creators simply modify internal 
components while preserving the code’s functionality and behaviour. Therefore, the comparison of the 
functional blocks of code structure to each known malware might accommodate a zero-day malware (Kaur 
and Singh, 2014) (Ucci, Aniello, and Baldoni, 2017). Note that throughout this research, the term virus and 
malware are used interchangeably. 
2.2 Understanding Advanced Malware 
The evaluation of malware can morph and mutate like an infectious virus to bypass signature present in 
the antivirus database without leaving a footprint (Rathnayaka and Jamdagni, 2017). There are multiple 
transformation techniques, including code permutation, register renaming, expanding and shrinking code, 
and the insertion of garbage code or other constructs (Cosovan, Benchea and Gavrilut, 2015). Such a case 
every time the malicious file presents itself, it looks different as it can change itself or evolve according to 
the theory of Darwin that is considered as a self-propagate feature. Some advanced malware samples 
employ two or three of these techniques together. Therefore, the complexity of detection and remediation 
in hosts and networks will increase significantly. Notably, determined attackers target misconfigured and 
unpatched systems to withdraw confidential information. They also aim regulated data eventually by 
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evading security defence systems such as a virtual sandbox that many organizations rely on today (Ling, 
Putra, and Ling, 2017). In other words, the attack data is able to travel across the network in the form of 
packets. When the characteristics of a certain malware are analysed, it is the fact that the evolution goes 
on and there are other species like that threat, live and somewhere compromising the system in a manner 
that’s not visible at all. That being the case, the APTs attack was found to live long and evade detecting in 
hosts and networks for more than a year (Shenwen, Yingbo, and Xiongjie, 2015). 
2.2.1 Understanding Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)  
In 2006, the United States Air Force (USAF) (https://www.airforce.com) analysts introduced the term of 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to describe attacks on governments and commercial organizations. 
Though, APTs also often target the valuable information found in smaller organizations. Frequently, due 
to lack of security technologies and expertise, these types of network infection have remained uncovered, 
so APTs coders never get caught. The largest APTs groups, fifteen of the most active APTs families, is 
classified by FireEye (https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/APTs-groups.html), all of which are still 
active across the cyber threat landscape. In practice, APTs can be based on software, hardware, social 
engineering or some combination of the three(Nissim et al., 2015). For this, cybercriminals can coordinate 
their attacks among various delivery venues, including email, the Web, social media, legitimate files, etc.  
(Ostrowski, 2014). APTs generally do not cause damage to company networks or local machines. Instead, 
the goal of it is most often data theft. This research is based on software only which effectively hide the 
attack from traditional malware detection analysis. 
APTs or multistage attack defines typically a more sophisticated and complicated threat vector that 
targeted a business by developing a custom exploit towards specific goals. The consequences of these 
incursions can be severe, and in some extreme cases cause a business to go bankrupt. On top of that, an 
anti-APTs solution does not exist at the time of this review (Shenwen, Yingbo, and Xiongjie, 2015). More 
advance sophisticated components are actively adapted by APTs writers to hide malicious software from 
inspection efforts. Nearly every new APTs attack includes features which are able to regulate its activities, 
to self-propagate, to strategically deliver other malware, and to maximize its damage while minimizing its 
footprint (Shenwen, Yingbo, and Xiongjie, 2015). The evasion techniques will easily escape security 
filters. Originally, this leads to a need of a comprehensive analysis which consists of several stages such 
as adding detection for known modules, collecting samples, reversing the samples, decrypting 
sophisticated encryption and compression schemes, understanding lateral movement, etc. To put 
everything together and reconstruct how the APT acted, what were its habits, what species it attacked, and 
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how these attacks were coordinated (Vert, Gonen and Brown, 2014).  Simply put, this requires time and 
patience which is not practical and desirable. On the other hand, APT attacks are difficult to uncover as 
specifically, they expect to encounter a Virtual Machine (VM) environment and develop their attacks 
accordingly. As it explained earlier, like a biological virus this generation is designed in multi-state and 
multi-vector attacks (Bolton and Anderson-Cook, 2017). To combat the complex malicious programs, 
security community will require sharpening their skills to discern and block advanced malware-free attacks 
before attackers can compromise the network environment. 
2.3 An Overview of Static and Dynamic Analysis  
For the purpose of malware classification and detection, traditional analyses could be further divided into 
two main categories: static analysis and dynamic analysis. Static features are extracted without executing 
the file under analysis, while dynamic ones are just the opposite. Dynamic features are obtained by 
watching the behaviours of a program during the run-time while static features are obtained by decompiling 
the byte code of a suspicious program. To give an overall view of these approaches , pros and cons of each 
of them are presented in  Table 2-2(Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2016)(Rezaei and Afraz, 2016)(Ahmadi 
et al., 2013)(Shabtai et al., 2012)(Damshenas, Dehghantanha and Mahmoud, 2013)(Gandotra, Bansal and 
Sofat, 2016)(Shijo and Salim, 2015)(Shalaginov, 2017)(Fraley, 2016)(Mohaisen, Alrawi and Mohaisen, 
2015). 
Static analysis just looks at the file itself and tries to extract information about the structure and data in the 
file. A case in point, the source code is one of static analysis method to understand the program behaviour 
without actually executing it. Dissemblers like IDA-Pro is used to decompile the source code, variables, 
pose functions and recognize the operations, etc. This analysis can be slow and exhaustive, but the result 
gained is very detailed(Ding et al., 2014). Moreover, it fails to detect threats with evolving capabilities 
such as metamorphic and polymorphic malware. Over and above that, it is incapable of defending against 
unknown or zero-day exploits (Thunga and Neelisetti, 2015), (Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2016). 
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Table 2-2 Comparison of Static and Dynamic Analysis 
Static  Dynamic  
Advantage Disadvantage Advantage  Disadvantage 
 A straightforward 
analysis  
 The higher speed 
of analysis and 
detection thereby 
providing rapid 
classification  
 Face obfuscation 
or in-memory 
mutation  
 Miss evasive 
malware and 
zero-day attacks 
 Require expert 
manual 
intervention  
 Not a fully 
automated 
solution  
 Newly released 
forms of malware 
can be 
distinguished 
 
 Verifying that a new file 
is malicious can be 
complex 
 Collection information 
requires a contained 
environment 
 Require expert manual 
intervention 
 The required period of 
time needed for 
observation is not clear 
hence  is time exhaustive 
and resource consuming 
 Not a fully automated 
solution  
On the other hand, a technique known as dynamic is monitored and collection information during the 
interaction of Operating System with a suspicious program at runtime. All requests to access specific files, 
processes, connections, or services will be analysed and collected. This collection can be a list of system 
calls, network access or memory modification (Rathnayaka and Jamdagni, 2017) (Xu et al., 2017) 
(Ghezelbigloo and Vafaeijahan, 2015). Depending on the methods used the behaviour of live malware is 
observed and learned in order to record every single step and intention at a real time. The complexity 
associated with this technique is to deal with well-designed metamorphic codes as they may behave 
differently in a control simulated environment in order to trick the analysts, resulting in the malicious 
verdict. Technically, the essential indicators of new threats will be cAPTsured if the malicious programs 
interact with real victim machine. It means to wait for potential harm to the system before it is identified 
as threats. Thus, the pitfalls would be losing harmless or useful files. Besides, the approaches based on this 
technique suffer from low false positives because they can easily be fooled once the behavioural analysis 
method is known (Shijo and Salim, 2015), (Afonso et al., 2015). 
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The effectiveness of the dynamic approach as compared to static one is doubtful because it is time and 
resource consuming, resulting hindering early detection(Islam et al., 2013)(Fraley, 2016). To address the 
weaknesses of these, an approaches hybrid analysis is studied. This is a combination of static and dynamic 
analysis regardless of execution in order to enrich its analysis results using data flow tracking and 
instruction tracing(Shijo and Salim, 2015).  
Authors of (Liu et al., 2013) (Tong and Yan, 2017) (Narouei et al., 2015), and (Gandotra, Bansal and 
Sofat, 2016) proposed the hybrid techniques which include features from both static and dynamic analysis 
of malware that can detect different types of malware effectively. They presented more accurate results as 
compared to the systems using features from static analysis or dynamic analysis alone. 
 (Tong and Yan, 2017) built up different pattern set of malicious and benign app based on their structure, 
profile, or through certain string patterns encoded in them. Although accurate, this method of analysis is 
expensive and slow. The above finding is consistent with the study by authors(Idrees et al., 2017). 
However, their framework relies on the information access to vital hardware and software resources.  As 
the authors (Tong and Yan, 2017) noted the drawback of the hybrid approach is applicable to their research 
approach. Due to the dynamic nature of attack profiles, the detection techniques fail to adjust to the 
temporal changes in real time. Specifically, for any change in the malicious pattern, the detection model 
will involve an updated profile with constant training. The quality of detection performance to judge new 
observation will wane drastically according to the model requirement. Therefore, the performance will 
often be exceeded resulting in a high rate of false positive alarms (Nauman, Azam, and Yao, 2016). 
2.4 Machine Learning (ML) 
The classification decisions or a result of prediction model depend on analysing the result of static or 
dynamic behavioural features (Alazab, 2015) (Milosevic, Dehghantanha and Choo, 2017). 
In general, ML is associated with the Artificial Intelligence (AI) in which mimicking human (brain) learning 
and learning through the experience. It is frequently overlapping or somehow originated with data mining, 
and pattern recognition to automatically deal with known and unknown patterns. As analysing pattern is 
involved with feature extraction in which non-important features will be phased out. ML has been practically 
applied in many fields covering domains including speech recognition, text categorization, source code 
plagiarism, metamorphic virus detection, and many others. By outlining, ML approaches offer, the 
predictive quality can give malware analysts to discover the breaches and initiate an incident response. 
 
18 
  ` 
i i 
 In addition, ML is designed and oriented towards new malware acquisition. By considering the ongoing 
“arms race” between malware creators and malware detectors; attempts at practicing ML algorithms to 
cybersecurity began in the 2000s to conquer the need to be automated in handling detection potential 
malicious files (Scott, Fellow, and Technology, 2017). Needless to say, it is practically impossible to 
manually detect and analyse such a huge number of suspicious file daily. 
Primarily, ML algorithms are grouped into three subgroups: supervised, unsupervised and semi-supervised. 
Table 1.3 presented aside-by-side comparison of these methods in agreement with  (Kaur and Singh, 2014), 
(Ucci, Aniello and Baldoni, 2017)(Comar et al., 2013)(Firdausi et al., 2010)(Mohaisen, Alrawi and 
Mohaisen, 2015). 
Several research proposals have been exhibited one or more detection techniques on the basis of robustness, 
efficiency, accuracy, computational overhead and noise tolerant parameter by applying ML methods (Ling, 
Putra and Ling, 2017)(Alam et al., 2015)(Shijo and Salim, 2015). The comparison between them is indicated 
in Table 2-3. 
Algorithm  Advantage  Disadvantage  Popular algorithms includes 
Supervised Work with known 
data 
Require labelled  data  
Misclassifications are 
all caused by very fuzzy 
data. 
 
SVM 
Decision Trees 
Random Forest  
K-Nearest Neighbour 
Unsupervised  Work with 
unlabelled data 
Work well with 
uncertain data 
Time consuming  K-means 
Fuzzy C means (C-means) 
Gaussian means (G-means) 
Hieratical clustering  
Semi-supervised  Worked with mixed 
labelled and 
unlabelled data 
  
Table 2-3Machine Learning Techniques 
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Setting a goal at the outset great greatly improves the chance of a successful ML application. When 
considering the use of ML within security viewpoints each of below goals would require different 
algorithms and different approaches:  
 To have some malware samples and want to find malware families. In this way, it is possible to 
associate unknown samples to already known families, and by consequence provide an added-value 
information for further analyses(Mastjik and Varol, 2015)(Canfora et al., 2015)(Ahmadi et al., 
2015)(Cheng, Tsai and Yang, 2013)(Bot, 2017)(Fan et al., 2016)(Sharma and Sahay, 2016). 
 Want to classify some network logs into malicious vs. benign to reduce the workload for human 
analysts(Zhao et al., 2015)(Bhatt, Yano and Gustavsson, 2014). 
 Want to make an early prediction on network traffic(Le, Zincir-Heywood and Heywood, 
2017)(Bekerman et al., 2015)(D. Liu et al., 2014). 
Malware analysis can be divided into two phases - malware detection and malware classification. 
Classification is a data mining function that assigns observations in a collection to target categories or 
classes. The goal of classification is to accurately predict the target class for each observation in 
the dataset. For instance, a classification model could be used to identify a suspicious file as malware or 
benign(Wang et al., 2013)(Baldangombo, Jambaljav, and Horng, 2013)(Fraley, 2016)(Yewale and Singh, 
2017). Commonly at the first step, an executable is detected if it is malicious, and if it contains a harmful 
part, then at the second step it is classified into some malware families for further research(Canfora et al., 
2015). However, in practice, a suspicious file may be categorized into a certain malware family first, which 
is considered to be an advantage in early malware detection(Ahmadi et al., 2015). Rule evaluation 
measures can be used in discovery of high quality rules; thereby, classification can be made based on these 
unexpectedness or usefulness rules (Liangboonprakong and Sornil, 2013).  
In an extension of approaches based on ML classification are fallen into two different evaluation; it is 
given in Table 2-4 (Comar et al., 2013). 
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Table 2-4 Malware Evaluation 
 
Malware 
Analysis   
Further categorize the malicious flows 
into one of the pre-existing malware 
or new malware. 
(Azab et al., 2015)(Ahmadi et al., 
2015)(Ahmadi et al., 2015) 
 Used to isolate malicious flows from 
the non-malicious ones. 
(Nissim et al., 2014)(Cosovan, 
Benchea and Gavrilut, 2015)(Liu et 
al., 2013)(Narouei et al., 2015) 
The first evaluation is based on single rules. Most existing detection frameworks are proposed based on 
this evaluation. They have been used to determine the stopping criteria for the rule generation and extract 
interesting rules for classification purpose. However, evaluation based on single rules might generate 
biased classification or overfitting results since it relies on user’s judgements or domain specific(Ahmadi 
et al., 2015)(Nissim et al., 2014). Building classifier rule based on link analysis can fall into this category. 
For the overall rule induction system performance, one also needs to consider the evaluation based on a 
rule set. The second evaluation is based on rule sets. It is more complicated than the other evaluation since 
there is more than one rule involved in making a decision. In this evolution, the relationships between rules 
in a set will analysis which is an essential step for this evaluation (Khazaee and Faez, 2014)(Nissim et al., 
2014).  
2.4.1 Supervised Machine Learning  
Supervised learning based approach is chosen to deal with known corpus but incomplete data. The 
classification accuracy depends on the features quality and the effectiveness of the classifier. Whereas 
clustering (unsupervised) chosen to deal with new inputs(Epishkina and Zapechnikov, 2016).  
A good example of Supervised Learning is a classification for malicious file detection. Due to the diversity 
of malware classes, imbalanced distribution and data imperfection issues, malware classifier model are 
challenging. The classification algorithm would be supplied a large dataset of files as well as the labels 
‘malicious’ or ‘benign’(Nissim et al., 2014). This is known as a training set; a dataset used to train the 
algorithm. The algorithm would produce a model which would correctly classify the training set(Nissim 
et al., 2014). Any new, unlabelled files are then passed against the model and mapped to ‘malicious’ or 
‘benign’, based on the trained model. Leaving a large fraction of samples unlabelled and hence delaying 
the signature distribution and abnormal behaviour in the system is accorded the greatest weakness of 
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supervised method (Pai et al., 2016). Hence, in line with the nature of the supervised algorithm, it difficult 
to detect new malware. Furthermore, poor performance on new and evolving malware is considered one 
of the limitations of this approach.  Therefore, research into more robust detection mechanisms is 
warranted by unsupervised algorithms (Mohammadi and Hamzeh, 2017). While Vector Machine and 
Hidden Markov Model was largely explored (Gharacheh et al., 2016) 
Therefore, a security solution must be put in place to ensure that such attacks with unknown patterns will 
be captured. This motivated academics and researchers have been employed unsupervised learning to 
address these challenges and identify flows of existing and novel malwares(Comar et al., 2013)(Wei, 
Sprague, and Warner, 2009)(Lin, Jiang and Lee, 2014)(Bot, 2017). 
2.4.2 Unsupervised Machine Learning  
Clustering algorithms are deployed in unsupervised learning problem. The process of organizing data 
points into groups whose members are similar in some way is defined as a clustering approach. Thereby, 
a cluster is a collection of unlabelled data which are similar between them and are dissimilar to the data 
belonging to other clusters. Empirically, regardless of its similarity measurement, the effectiveness of this 
approach is affected heavily by extracted key features. For each pair of points that share at least one cluster 
in the overlapping clustering results. Therefore, the only thing which potentially tricky is that a given point 
may appear in multiple clusters(Khazaee and Faez, 2014).  
In the overall picture, some advanced malwares are able to overcome the traditional methods based on 
supervised machine learning. Though, detecting advanced malware is a challenge and requires and 
innovative learning approach. Recent research has depicted that clustering as a persuasive option for 
malware detection (Comar et al., 2013) (Wei, Sprague, and Warner, 2009) (Bot, 2017)(Wang et al., 
2013)(Pandeeswari and Kumar, 2016)(Liu et al., 2017). This type of unsupervised ML approach can be 
further divided into two categories: Hard-Clustering and Soft-Clustering (Mohammed, Mohammed, and 
Saraee, 2016). 
Hard Clustering: In hard clustering, each data point either belongs to a cluster completely or not. For 
example, the malicious file is put into one group out of the 10 groups. 
Soft Clustering: In soft clustering, instead of putting each data point into a separate cluster, a probability 
or likelihood of that data point to be in those clusters is assigned. For example, from the research scenario, 
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each APT group is assigned a probability to be in either of five clusters of the families. Furthermore, this 
method does not require prior information to learn from the data. 
As indicated, limitation of hard clustering forms ill boundaries that leads into the data space often 
overlapping the perimeters of the surrounding cluster. The inherent limitation of hard clustering persuaded 
researchers to apply soft clustering to fulfil the research objectives.  
Table 2-5 Comparison of Clustering Techniques 
Type Reference  Limitation  Advantage Sample  
Hard/Crisp (Zolotukhin and 
Hämäläinen, 2014) 
(Narra et al., 
2016)(Mohammadi 
and Hamzeh, 
2017)(Sarvani, 
2017) 
High probability of ill-defined 
boundaries 
No capable of dealing with 
over-lapping 
No capable of handling 
extreme outlier points  
 
Work well with 
highly structure 
data 
Provides 
efficient results 
in case of large 
datasets  
Easy to 
implement 
k-means 
Soft /Fuzzy  (Huang et al., 
2012)(Khazaee 
and Faez, 
2014)(Khazaee 
and Sharifi Rad, 
2013) 
Time consuming  
The probability of looping in 
local optimum  
largely depends on 
initialization values  
Highly dimensionality  
Work well with 
vagueness, 
uncertainty, 
loosely 
structured data  
Flexible and 
robust toward 
new data point 
Improve the 
detection over 
the time 
C-means 
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The current lack of automatic and labelling of a large number of complicated malware samples led to a 
possible solution to automatically cluster malware sample. Additionally, efficient process this huge influx 
of new malware samples and accurately label them is another theme of concern. Furthermore, avoid 
analysing samples that have already been analysed and label new incoming samples by soft clustering rather 
than crisp clustering to avoid producing sharp partitioning is providing a scope for further investigation. 
Invariably, using a new form of a fuzzy-based clustering algorithm for grouping close malicious code 
together in the same cluster will repetitive analyses(Khazaee and Sharifi Rad, 2013)(Bernardi et al., 
2017).C-Means clustering is a well-known approach and works very efficiently for most of the cases. Fuzzy 
C Means clustering is based on fuzzy logic and is used when data is to be divided through fuzzy partitions. 
Fuzzy clustering, offers further advantages in a way that an instance may belong to more than one cluster 
as the membership degrees is between zero and one(Shalaginov, Grini and Franke, 2016)(Huang et al., 
2013)(Pandeeswari and Kumar, 2016)(Shalaginov, 2017). However, Fuzzy-C means will tend to run slower 
than K means, since it's actually doing more work. Each point is evaluated with each cluster, and more 
operations are involved in each evaluation. K-Means just needs to do a distance calculation, whereas fuzzy 
c means needs to do a full inverse-distance weighting(Narra et al., 2016). 
In hierarchical clustering, smaller clusters can be combined and larger clusters can be divided into smaller 
clusters. This hierarchy of clusters is also called dendrogram which displays a tree diagram.There are two 
types of approaches, top down and bottom up. In top down approach, larger clusters get divided in to smaller 
clusters, where as in bottom up approach small clusters are merged into larger ones(Sarvani, 2017).  
2.5   Data Mining  
Data mining is the core of knowledge discover process. Data is mined to identify associations and also to 
anticipate behaviour pattern. Data mining evolved from simple taking out of raw data to an analytical 
process from a large amount of data in order to discover knowledge, see Figure 2-1. The process of 
knowledge discovery includes: selecting, exploring, modifying, modelling and rating large of amounts of 
data. In general, the benefits of data mining come from the ability to uncover hidden patterns and 
relationships in data that can be used to make predictions that impact prediction or 
classification(Mohammed, Mohammed, and Saraee, 2016). What information is mined depend on the 
specific objective to achieve? It assists automation with important keywords, strong features as input for 
ML algorithms(Epishkina and Zapechnikov, 2016). By that it has been extensively applied as a suitable 
framework in many areas such from modelling to predict weather pattern, recognize imagine especially at 
decision-making level (Bist and Campus, 2014)(Mendel, John, and Liu, 2006). 
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Figure 2-1Data Mining Process 
 Previous works have shown that data mining is the process of studying sample files with the aim of 
acquiring knowledge about its pattern to spot each instant (malware) via pattern matching techniques is a 
promising approach (Siddequi, Wang and Lee, 2008)(Azab et al., 2015)(Homayoun et al., 2017)(Islamic 
and Minna, no date). Solutions to this problem will facilitate initial triage of new samples into existing 
families or as potential new families. As (Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014) have also indicated, this study 
is improve the efficiency of the detection process. Besides, it has been incorporated into methods of 
classification and clustering to empower handling levels of uncertainty in real-world complex problems 
such as malware detection (Souri and Hosseini, 2018). Moreover, this approach is broadly used in different 
types: pattern recognition, fault detection, medical diagnosis reasoning, etc. 
As claimed by  (Ye, 2017)(Azab et al., 2015),  data mining is a convincing method for malware detection. 
In the current research, data are a list of the opcode sequence from each malware family. Hence, the 
discovered knowledge will be opcode patterns, associations, or relationships among all opcode in one 
family. The process of pattern detection and understanding logical relationships accrue after 
standardization of raw dataset. The better clustering segmentation wold appeared when the data mining 
technique does not tolerate minor difference of code structure (Wang, 2014). In order to extract some rules 
to evaluate pattern matching process association rule mining is used in this study. 
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Schultz et al. (Schultz et al., 2001)  were the first to present the idea of data mining for malware detection. 
They use the static features such as strings, byte sequence and features from PE and used the Naïve Bayes 
method for classification purpose. Their results were upgraded by (Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014)who 
make use of n-gram and various classification methods to detect new malicious. Detection system using 
iterative SVM clustering to provide the best accuracy. 
2.5.1 Association Rule in Data Mining 
Association rule mining is the data mining process of finding the rules that may govern associations, 
correlations, or causal structures from data sets. It can be done in both scenarios, supervised and 
unsupervised learning. However, it is not a classification technique, it is used for frequent pattern and 
sequence pattern or a combination of both to obtain data model. Initially, association rule mining was used 
in unsupervised scenarios to discover interesting or novel patterns. It is originally designed to work with 
discrete (categorical) data(Epishkina and Zapechnikov, 2016). Link Analysis is chosen to apply among the 
many different techniques used for data mining such as sequential pattern mining or frequent mining. Link 
analysis is based on a branch of mathematics called graph theory, which represents relationships between 
different objects as edges in a graph. This relation-oriented methodology displays nodes and links based 
on their weighted values; node size and link width represent the relative size of the node and link values. 
Scores the nodes and edges, therefore, the edge thickness representing the strength of association and 
differing node sizes representing qualitative properties of the node. In general the higher the weight, the 
higher the contribution to the influence metric.  For instance, one of the macros calculates influence 
centrality in addition to degree centrality(Y. Liu et al., 2014).SAS® software packages  provide the link 
analysis node  and Profile Segment node inside Enterprise Miner™ 14.3. SAS® Enterprise Miner™  is a 
state of the art predictive analytic and data mining software package that enables organisations to analyse 
complex data, find useful insights and act confidentially to make fact based decisions. It contains the link 
analysis macros which is easy to generate and interpret.  
This associative graph has been successfully adopted for various information and social networks 
(Thompson, 2008).This sort of analysis aims to discover patterns of activity that can be used to derive 
useful conclusions and business information about a subject for example malware sample. Give such 
insight, this research presents a novel feature construction model based on link analysis, which is effective 
to derived shared similarity in malware family instructions.  
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The research is equipped with Link Analysis to discover unknown opcodes links patterns. As the name 
suggests, this technique would help analyse the association rules between two or more items in large data 
sets. In the current scenario, Link Analysis has demonstrated the similarity of opcode fragments the 
similarity of two malicious based on measuring which is generated by Link Analysis macros. The formula 
for similarity comparison of code sequences is deduced through association rule mining analysis. Based 
upon the generated  values ,the probability of each malware group belong to is calculated (Ban et al., 
2015). 
2.5.2 Mining Opcode Relevance  
Opcode (Operational Code) are machine language instruction that performs CPU operations on operands 
such as logical, arithmetic, data manipulation and program control(Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014). 
Part of source code is visible in Figure 2-2.Identifying similar or identical code fragment among program 
is valuable in some applications such as, code theft detection. As malware program contains the various 
sequence of opcode by usage of obfuscated techniques to hinder detection procedure(Gharacheh et al., 
2016). Code obfuscated methods are often employed by malicious intention to lessen the effectiveness of 
the detection system. This mechanism is achieved by dead code insertion, variable renaming, statement 
reordering, expression reshaping, break transformation or join transformation and so on. Thereby, malware 
analysis mechanism requires the knowledge of source code or structure of the program to determine the 
monopoly of functions. To find inherent regularities in the opcode, algorithms of association discovery are 
employed. Different type pf association mining algorithms such as frequent , sequential patterns, cyclic 
association, cluster analysis introduced in malware analysis by (Mooney and Roddick, 2013)(O’Kane, 
Sezer and McLaughlin,2014)(Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014)(Liangboonprakong and Sornil, 
2013)(Mastjik and Varol, 2015)(Yewale and Singh, 2017)(Ding et al., 2014). 
 
                                               Figure 2-2 Assembly code example generated by IDA-pro 
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A very first framework based on N-gram and K-Nearest was presented by Abou-assaleh (2004) in the n-
gram method, based upon some length sequences.  The model requires substrings of a larger string with a 
length, for example, the string “MALWARE”, can be segmented into several 4-grams: “MALW”, 
“ALWA”. “LWAR”, ”WARE” and so on.  Once the set is chosen, n-grams for every file extracted in that 
set that acts as the file signature. Figure 2-3 is illustrated N-gram 2 and 3. As authors (O’Kane, Sezer and 
McLaughlin, 2014) and (Liangboonprakong and Sornil, 2013) the detection system can classify any 
unknown instance as malware or benign software based on N-gram concept. The assignment of a new 
executable file was based on the most similarity of the representative profile of each malware and clean in 
the dataset. However, as Fraley (2016) highlighted this technique practically useless for polymorphic and 
metamorphic malware samples. 
 
Figure 2-3 Illustration of N-gram Structure (O’Kane, Sezer and McLaughlin, 2014) 
Over the past has seen the different models by observing opcode pattern to detect and eliminate new 
unknown malware in a prompt manner(Wang et al., 2016)(Runwal, Low and Stamp, 2012)(Canfora et al., 
2015) (Ding et al., 2014)(Santos et al., 2013)(Santos et al., no date)(Yewale and Singh, 2017)(Sharma and 
Sahay, 2016)(O’Kane, Sezer and McLaughlin, 2014)(Hu and Tan, 2017). The methodology for malware 
categorization by implementation concepts from text categorization is used by (Shabtai et al., 
2012)(Suarez-tangil et al., 2014). By considering the fact that, in real time setting, patterns within the 
words change over time just like the malware characteristic(Nissim et al., 2014). However the drawback 
of supervised models is training sets should be designed accordingly otherwise misclassification will 
appear(Nissim et al., 2014)(Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 2014)(Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2016).  
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For this reason, the authors (Suarez-tangil et al., 2014) observed and measured the similarity between 
malware samples by using clustering techniques in which it succeeded in dealing with supervised learning 
problems. 
2.6 Analysis to Detect Malware 
The amount of unknown malware is growing at a staggering rate. Computer users often download malware 
to their computer by unknowingly visiting a malicious web-page hosting a drive-by download attack, by 
clicking on a malicious link included in an email, or by inserting a USB thumb drive containing malware 
into their computer. Once the malware gets to the organization there will be a breach in private data, 
disruption in operations or destruction in infrastructure by using a wide range of tactics and tools(Security 
and Report, 2017). The sheer number and variety of known and unknown attack strategy is part of the 
reason why detection cyber-attack is a difficult problem. 
The method for indication of an attack and classification mainly fall into two broad categories: Signature-
based, Behaviour/anomaly-based and Heuristic/specification (Deka, Sarma and Panicker, 
2017)(Gharacheh et al., 2016)(Bist and Campus, 2014)(Santos et al., no date; Zhang et al., 2011)(Kaur 
and Singh, 2014) (Damshenas, Dehghantanha and Mahmoud, 2013) (Pai et al., 2016) (Scott, Fellow and 
Technology, 2017)(Louk et al., 2014)(Nauman, Azam and Yao, 2016)(Nissim et al., 2014)(Hassani and 
Zarei, 2015) (Baldangombo, Jambaljav and Horng, 2013). The advantages and disadvantage of each 
method are summarized in Table 2-6 and different methods belong to each category are presented in 
Figure 2-5. 
Table 2-6Malware Detection Methods 
Methods  Pros. Cons. 
Signature-based 
 
Effective and efficient against a common 
type of viruses  
The low percentage of false alarm 
The high speed of detection 
Fail to detect unknown malware and 
undocumented  attacks 
Fail to detect crafted malware such as 
polymorphic and metamorphic  
The high amount of manpower and 
time  
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Behaviour-based  Polymorphic/Zero-day malwares can be 
detected.  
Obtaining comprehensive information 
about the malware 
Identifying what the malware does in a 
specific environment when files are 
opened 
Detecting an individual instance of 
malware targeted at a person or 
organization 
False positive remain an issue 
The high amount of scanning time 
Require safe environment like a 
virtual sandbox 
Fail to detect curtailing malicious 
activities  
Restriction of a Cloud-based solution   
Hybrid  Depends on the feature extraction 
techniques the accuracy of malware 
detection effectively is improved. 
Depends on the feature extraction 
techniques there is time complexity 
of training or evaluation phase 
Signature-based detectors compare signatures (using MD5 or other hashes) of files into a predefined 
database of known malicious files. Signatures are created by examining the internal components of an 
object. The object could be data which collected from static or dynamic analysis. The good and unknown 
file is categorized in one group and malware and its. The similarity between two objects is measured by 
counting the number of common blocks. If they match, the file is treated as a 'threat' (Yewale and Singh, 
2017).  
At this point, the challenge can be seen when it comes to the detection of a new variation of known malware 
families. On the other hand, many hackers have begun using polymorphic or encrypted code segments 
which are very difficult to create a signature for. Hence, malware authors can make signature detection 
redundant(Alazab, 2015). In response, observation of a particular pattern or abnormal behaviour was born 
as behaviour-based scanning(Ding et al., 2014).  For example, malware is better able to watch when it has 
been placed in a virtual environment such as a sandbox. Yet, detecting malware using behavioural analysis 
involves heavily instrumenting the operating system. Besides, it is time-consuming to observe programs 
as they run for suspicious or malicious behaviours in order to stop them(Mohammed, Mohammed, and 
Saraee, 2016). Over above that, many behaviour solutions are exclusively cloud-based which may be an 
issue for some organizations. Putting it all together the scheme of each approach is illustrated in Figure 2-4 
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based on gain knowledge of present works by (Wang et al., 2013)(Wang and Wang, 2015)(Hu and Tan, 
2017)(Alazab, 2015). 
 
Figure 2-4 Malware Analysis Scheme 
Some malware detects a specific registry key related to a virtual environment, allowing the threat to evade 
an automatic sandbox as well as an analyst attempting to dynamically run the suspected malware binary 
in a virtual machine(Mehra and Pandey, 2016). Both signature and behaviour-based malware detection are 
important and have advantages. These methodologies, while valid, waste resources and are imprecise 
because they assume that neither the malware nor its behaviour will mutate. Theoretically, behaviour and 
signature-based approaches hold some promise, but as pure technologies, they fail; as result, usage of these 
methods is debatable to detect or predict (Das et al., 2016).  In response, a hybrid analysis, specification-
based, is introduced by utilizing both techniques. The scheme of each technique is illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-5 Taxonoly of Malware Detection Techniques 
The authors(Yewale and Singh, 2017) in explained that features analysis conducted by analysing bytes, 
binary, and disassembly. This type of analysis measured certain patterns in the malware and was 
exemplified by(O’Kane, Sezer and McLaughlin, 2014), and(Ekhtoom et al., 2016). 
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2.7 Techniques over Malware Detection 
The ability to detect both known and unknown or zero-day threats provides a huge benefit for businesses 
that simply cannot afford the potential downtimes, data breaches, and remediation costs resulting from 
mitigated malware attacks. 
In the authority of  Internet Security Threat Report released by Symantec in 2016 (Security and Report, 
2017), over more than 357 million new variants were observed in 2016. Thus, signature-based detection 
is not scalable when there are more than hundreds of new signatures every day, let alone when there are 
hundreds of thousands. With the daily creation of nearly one million unseen and newly establish attacks, 
the existing anti-malware systems which are based on signature and behavioural mechanisms cannot 
practically challenge this issue  (Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2016). In order to solve this issue, the 
utilization of machine learning aided has been effectively employed along with the integration of static 
and dynamic approaches. 
The characteristic of obfuscated viruses poses a great challenge to the security professionals leading to the 
deployment of integration of ML techniques(Comar et al., 2013)(Mohammadi and Hamzeh, 2017)(Bot, 
2017)(Alazab, 2015). Malware is grouped into a malware family according to its particular functionality. 
Nevertheless, the attacks of same malware families are very similar in terms of file content and 
characteristics(Liangboonprakong and Sornil, 2013). 
Suitably, features analysis key argument is that no matter what code is being executed, the end result is 
still the same. Subsequently, with grouping similar sophisticated malware attacks together, discover a new 
group of threats will accrue.   
From the perspective of a growing number of unique malware samples, it is important to group similar 
malware variants for two main reasons. First relates to human resources: malware analysts do not have to 
analyse every single variant, just some representative samples(Nissim et al., 2014). The second reason it 
is linked to the fact that grouping variants from the same family could help anti-malware companies to add 
generic detection for that family(Liangboonprakong and Sornil, 2013)(Canfora et al., 2015)(Milosevic, 
Dehghantanha and Choo, 2017). Bilar (2007) for first time lesser frequent opcode could be used to identify 
polymorphic and metaphoric malware. He demonstrated the malicious code has a lower basic block count, 
implying a simpler structure. Santos et al. (2013) computed the cosine similarity between opcode sequence 
length n of 2 variant and the other variants of that specific malware family each malware and its set of 
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variants. This model mined the importance of each opcode and evaluated the repetition of opcode group 
to discover obscure malware families. This approach is consistent with literature (Hu et al., 2013). Code 
instruction in variants malware type may tend to change; however, distinct frequent sequential patterns 
and its association may homogeneous in a malware family(Hu et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2-6 Overview of the proposed system by(Hu et al., 2013) 
In later papers, reduction in the effort of labelling that is required for the training phase and highlights the 
issue of unpacking malware by (Rathnayaka and Jamdagni, 2017) and also (Zolotukhin and Hämäläinen, 
2014). The authors (Milosevic, Dehghantanha and Choo, 2017) tested several learning methods and proved 
the malware can be detected with a high degree of accuracy using opcode-sequence by supervised learning. 
Philip(O’Kane, Sezer and McLaughlin, 2014) used SVM classification to determine the ability of N-gram 
analysis. Their study presented dynamic N-gram analysis for N<= 4 clearly spot an opportunity for 
detecting obfuscated malware.  
Malware analysis has been investigated extensively, however, shortcomings still exist for advanced 
malicious software which is specifically crafted for such target sectors: Healthcare, Defence, Aerospace, 
Government, Media, and Universities(Shenwen, Yingbo and Xiongjie, 2015). What follows describes 
these methods. 
Table 2-7 Comparison of opcode in Malware Detection 
File 
representation  
Reference  Techniques Merits Demerits 
Opcode 
sequence 
(O’Kane, 
Sezer and 
McLaughlin, 
2014) 
k-clustering 
centroid mean 
Improve detection 
with a classifier  
Not metamorphic, 
Runtime 
performance unclear 
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Opcode 
frequency 
(Yewale and 
Singh, 
2017)(Chandran, 
Hrudya and 
Poornachandran, 
2015) 
SVM, Random 
Forst, BOOST 
and Decision 
Tree 
Random Forest 
provided better 
accuracy and zero 
per cent false 
positive ratio. 
Classify malware 
only into two 
categories: 
goodware or 
malware 
The frequency 
of Opcode 
sequence  
(Santos et al., no 
date) 
Computation 
the mutual 
information 
Static-based  
Able to detect the most 
number of malware 
variants whilst the 
number of false 
positives is kept to 0 
Able to distinguish 
benign executables  
The longer sequence 
didn’t use as features  
An experiment 
performed  with a 
small malware 
dataset(1319 malware 
and 13000 benign) 
(Zhang et al., 2011) explored that a dynamic system relies on fuzzy inference based on hidden malware 
behaviour. Although the proposed technique produces a retail model of malware; change of input data 
characteristics require re-training of the whole model. This is a critical issue when malware detection 
requires a fast update of the decision rules while adding new characteristics. The developed rules should 
be tested, modified and further tested and modified again in order to reduce false negatives and false 
positives. Anyhow, false positives are unavoidable but they can be kept low(Mohammadi and Hamzeh, 
2017). 
In the next subsection, firstly classification of malware families discussed. Next the use of clustering and 
data mining argued. 
2.7.1 Classification of Malware  
The ML model is considered more practical which the trained model can be used to detect similar data. In 
other words, data can be scored against a trained model, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of 
similarity to the training data. However, malware functionality it remains the same while its structure is 
changing. The metamorphic generator presents malware files look like benign files. Therefore, apart from 
an indication of malicious code from benign; identification of malware families (multiple classes) is 
another way to allow malware analysts to uncover zero-day threats(Ling, Putra and Ling, 2017).  
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A common single classification method designs either by utilizing the collection of static or dynamic 
features of a malware. However, the current trend in the identification of malicious code is to integrate 
both techniques to prevent malware users to evade defences. Islam et al (Islam et al., 2013) tested the first 
classification method which equipped with combination of static and dynamic information into a single 
training test. Based on their finding, Random Forest ML technique performed the best accuracy to classify 
the latest malicious code. 
Motivated by the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based classification system, (Thunga and Neelisetti, 
2015) were able to identify the family of metaphoric malware files. The authors trained and tested multiple 
HMM’s to measure score of a family virus-based opcode sequence similarity. The proposed technique 
gave an accuracy of about 90% in each virus samples. In addition, the author concluded computation based 
on distance to centroids in K –means provided considerable result in terms of precision and overall 
accuracy. In their method first, extract features from it by HMM models. Similarly, Gharacheh et al. (2016) 
tested the idea of combining different approaches to increase the efficiency in terms of time by using 
trained HMM in two layers based on the important sequence of the opcode. These techniques are aimed at 
deriving a model that captures the similarity of a given metamorphic family. Yet, the important factor of 
malware group similarity of viruses is not considered  (Rezaei and Afraz, 2016). 
Similarity and metamorphic detection Software similarity is a potentially helpful recommendation for 
detecting metamorphic malware. In this regard, malware creators commonly redistribute the original 
malware code to increase the likelihood of evading current recognition mechanisms (Ucci, Aniello and 
Baldoni, 2017)(Luo, Ming and Wu, 2017). 
The appearance of malware is different even in one family which making it difficult to identify a common 
feature of each group. Moreover, it is ambiguous to what extent it is essential to retrain the classifier with 
new files. Thereby, a feature selection method which improves the classification of advanced malware 
families could be extended to unsupervised learning approach. 
2.7.2 Clustering of Malware  
One of the most popular approaches to data mining is clustering methods. In recent years, various 
research has introduced new thresholding techniques based on data mining or subsets to control the noises 
of data like malicious codes. Due to the complexity and high volumes of malware on daily basis usage of 
data mining is increased in the area of cybersecurity publication(Fraley, 2016) (Gandotra, Bansal and 
Sofat, 2016) (Ye, 2017) (Souri and Hosseini, 2018).  
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Since uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic of a malicious program; the role of fuzzy methods will 
help to filter virus threats and also fight with a zero-day virus attack. Recently, the study of Neuro Fuzzy 
(NF) has been reported by (Shalaginov, 2017)as a mechanism for proactive malware detection. This 
method is covered limitations of methods in which require retraining of the whole model as authors argued 
in. The proposed is upgraded their previous work in a way that reduces the rate of malware misdiagnosis 
from VM and decreases inaccurate analysis results by malware detectors. Three of the most well-known 
methods for grouping observations in a cluster analysis are a single linkage, complete linkage, and average 
linkage. The choice of distance measures is very important, as it has a strong influence on the clustering 
results. For most common clustering software, the default distance measure is the Euclidean distance. 
2.8 Dealing with Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) 
Dealing with the exponential growth of APT attack together with evading techniques is a serious concern. 
Since the attackers behind the APT want both convenient and deniability. APT attack detection techniques 
are evolving and facing open issues. On the report of FireEye, APT attackers receive direction and support 
from an established nation state. Whether their mission is to steal data, disrupt operations or destroy 
infrastructure, these threat actors tenaciously pursue their goal using a wide range of tools and tactics. To 
detect malware link to still, the security team should pay close attention when their security tools detect 
malware linked to previous APT attacks. APT ecosystem is a group of advance malware families that work 
together to perform the same objective. A malware family is a collection of malware in which each sample 
shares a significant amount of code with all of the others. Perhaps the simplest and most typical ecosystem 
is a dropper and a backdoor that is used tighter. They may not share the same code structure, but they are 
related because one drops and installs the other. Therefore, detect APTs is a challenge and requires and 
hybrid approach to detect and remediate.  
2.8.1 Common Techniques to Detect Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) 
An APTS is typically a more sophisticated attack in which an unauthorized user gains access to a system 
or network and remains there for an extended period of time without being detected. The current lack of 
automatic and speedy labelling of a large number of unknown APTs samples seen every day leading to a 
low detection rate of new malware samples in the wild. As the number of clusters is ambiguous and it is 
not easy to mention beforehand according to have prior knowledge of the dataset. Hence K-Means 
clustering as a hard clustering algorithm is not suitable for this particular problem (Wang and Zhang, 
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2007). Conventionally, intrusion detection systems have been categorized as signature-based or anomaly 
based. 
The authors (Shenwen, Yingbo and Xiongjie, 2015) reviewed the available literatures on APTs attack 
detection and introduced an architecture based on big data processing. The proposed detection system 
performs trace back and predicate APTs attack, as well as increase the APTs, attack warning. Until date, 
these issues have not been answered properly. 
While opcode is considered an efficient feature for malware detection, there has been limited attempt to 
use opcode mining for APTs malware classification. This could be, perhaps, due to the lack of suitable 
research datasets and the difficulties in collecting APTs samples. In addition, using machine learning for 
robust malware detection in APTs appear to be another understudied topic. Hence, in the paper, we seek 
to contribute this gap by exploring the potential of using Opcodes as features for APTs classification with 
unsupervised learning. Accordingly, ML approaches have capabilities to discover and predict data 
breaches attributed by obscure malware. 
2.9 Summary and Remarks 
There are a few observation that can be made about the growing trend in advanced malware detection: 
a. The traditional signature-based are purely based on signature have zero resilience against new 
attacks of self-modification malware variants at runtime. Hence, this type of defence approach lacks 
the ability to specify a new threat. That is why usage specification-based take into consideration to 
address this deficiency. 
b. An issue with the behavioural-based methods to evaluating whether the suspicious behaviour on the 
system, is that the information about a sequence of an event like API calls is insufficient. Moreover, 
the complexity of the approach makes the system works slower. More importantly, this approach 
requires the involvement of security expertise to determine a program is malicious which is resource 
consuming and also time exhaustive. 
c. Specification-based approaches to developing an ML malware detector. For this reason, detectors 
which are entirely based on heuristic have a very low resilience against new attacks of metamorphic 
malware families. 
d. Malware analysis approach is a potential method for attaining a complete understanding of new 
malicious behaviour. The integration of both static and dynamic analysis is used conduct to high 
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performance and time-effective malware systems. Still, the main problem with this system is the 
high false positive and false negative rate. Nevertheless, the process of developing an automated 
classification model which are based on features obtained from static and dynamic analysis 
frequently is time to consume with high accuracy due to the large feature set. 
e. Signature based methods must be along with another approach that can able to detect unknown 
malwares. The machine learning is a suitable approach to complement classical signature based 
malware detection system.  
f. Malware detection is similar to other related fields, such as software plagiarism and text 
categorization techniques. In the analogy to text categorization, using words or sequences of words 
as features is analogous to using the opcode group.  
g. It does not appear to be any previous work involving similarity techniques or analysis for APTs 
classification.   
h. Data mining is a close relative. It focuses on using machine learning, pattern recognition and 
statistics to discover patterns in data. Besides, clustering would fall into the machine learning/pattern 
recognition realm. 
Summarizing briefly, malicious code detection, which is considered as a sort of pattern recognition could 
be fairly solved by integration of both data mining and clustering algorithm. Data mining and clustering 
are complementary technologies. This combination method will articulate both advantages of the two, 
from mining relevance features, learning abilities, optimization abilities, connectionist structure to 
clustering. Sharing of structural information of malware types based on attributes and hidden links is 
consider a method to detect known and unknown malware. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
3 Overview  
As discussed earlier, the goal of this work is to assess the capability of using link analysis concept as rule 
mining with the integration of unsupervised machine learning approach in malware family classification. 
The hypothesis is shaped in a way that this work is given sufficient static analysis, the clustering algorithms 
may form well-separated malware sample to the respective family. The basis for the proposed techniques 
and the underlying research methodology are presented next.  
3.1 Fundamental Techniques and the Proposed Models 
In the section, the techniques, tool, and languages are inputted in this research is covered. Next, clustering 
techniques are discussed. Followed by dealing data for ML. Since each programming language has its own 
advantages for each specific task one language hasn’t been chosen for the entire project but it always uses 
the one with lowest implementing costs for each given task. The research idea is driven by (Rathnayaka 
and Jamdagni, 2017), visible in Figure 3-1. 
The proposed framework consists of three major phases (A, B, and C), namely: Feature Extraction, 
Feature Selection, and Selected Algorithm Assessment. To establish each phase from A to C the necessary 
steps are show cased in details in each phase. The idea behind the approach is structured by the proposed 
approach in (Hu et al., 2013).Phase A is accomplished by a mixture of Python, MATLAB, and Excel 
scripts for feature extraction purpose. All the scripts are written from scratch. As stated, phase B practiced 
in SAS® Enterprise Miner™ to construct the opcodes graph to demonstrate the feature construction 
process. The multiple results of link analysis technique formed into a single dataset to identify factors that 
differentiate data segments from the population. Further exploration and profiling of the segmentation 
results will reveal how effective this method is at identifying segments. For this reason, Phase C is shaped 
to do the process of partitioning task. Data clustering is adopted to generate valuable features for future 
data-driven decision making. Finally, results of phase C is verified in the same phase.  
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The task is to develop the best mechanism for classifying malware files a given dataset into groups. Phase 
A and B will be outlined in details in section 3.7. Phase C will be described in 3.8.  
 
Figure 3-1Architecture of the malicious code detector 
For this purpose, R-3.4.3 language used since a variety of clustering algorithms and functions are available 
both in statistical R packages and libraries. A collection of R Statistical packages/ libraries pack has been 
used which is listed in Table 3.2. As stated, the method is assessed with a standard package in which 
established leading clustering algorithms from statistics and ME implemented. 
Name of the package Key Usage 
Mclust 
 
For model-based clustering, classification, and 
density estimation based on finite normal mixture 
modelling.  
To provide functions for parameter estimation via the 
EM algorithm for normal mixture models with a 
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variety of covariance structures, and functions for 
simulation from these models.  
It also included are functions that combine model-
based hierarchical clustering, EM for mixture 
estimation and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) in comprehensive strategies for clustering, 
density estimation, and discriminant analysis. 
Additional functionalities are available for displaying 
and visualizing fitted models along with clustering, 
classification, and density estimation results. 
Table 3-1 R-packages 
The classification of observations into groups requires some methods to calculate the distance or the 
(dis)similarity between each pair of observations. The result of this computation is known as a dissimilarity 
or distance matrix. Generally, it is recommended to standardize the variables before distance matrix 
computation. Standardization makes variable comparable, in the situation where they are measured in 
different scales. The results of link analysis in current research provide standard variables. In this research, 
common distance measures that best differentiate each cluster are ranked by segmentation analysis and 
evaluate by GMM algorithm.  
 
Figure 3-2 Clustering Distance 
There are many methods to calculate this distance of observations. Common distance measures in 
unsupervised algorithms iteratively collects points/groups together until the desired number of clusters 
enlisted. The distribution of observations after conducting link analysis is visible in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3Malware samples for clustering 
According to the research objective we want our clusters to be as compact and separated as possible. In 
the following section, the justification why the Expectation Maximization clustering using GMMs 
implemented in Phase C provided. The most leading clustering algorithms-namely   Centroid-based 
clustering (k-means, k-medoid), Connectivity-based clustering (hierarchical clustering), and Distribution-
based clustering (Expectation Maximization /Gaussian mixture models) briefly explained as follow. 
3.2 Expectation Maximization (EM) Clustering  
The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is a soft clustering technique. It used for the iterative 
computation of maximum likelihood (ML) estimates. The EM algorithm is commonly used for estimating 
the mixture model density. Moreover, it is useful in a variety of problems where the data may be viewed 
as incomplete data. Wherefore, EM can be viewed as clustering based on “hidden” probability distribution. 
Gaussian probability distribution employed to assess the strength of association between clusters and 
instances. 
3.3 K-means and K-medoids Clustering 
Key points of K-Means is summaries in Table 3-2. As discussed in chapter two, hierarchical clustering 
is a good tool for exploratory analysis in multivariate statistics whereas K-means clustering is a good tool 
for modelling. K-means clustering allows the observations to be moved from one group to another 
APT Kaggle 
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throughout the algorithm, a process that does not occur in hierarchical methods. The results of the 
hierarchical cluster analysis are used to set k in the K-means cluster analysis. 
Table 3-2 K-means algorithm key points  
K-Means Algorithm Key Notes 
Takes the number of component of the population equal to the final required number of clusters 
Examines each component in the population  
Assigns it to one of the clusters depending on the minimum distance 
Centroid’s position it recalculated every time a component is added 
Unable to handle noisy and outliners 
Need to specify k, the number of clusters, in advance 
It is hard to assign number of clusters when the overlapping occurs in soft clustering. K-means uses 
Euclidean distance to the centre. Therefore, if the clusters define by non-circular shape K-means cannot 
discover with this type of assignment of features. K-medoid or pam is based on centroids or medoid. Both 
k-means and k-medoids algorithms are breaking the dataset up into k groups. That is, we determine the 
parameters of K probability distributions that specify the clusters. Moreover, they are both trying to 
minimize the distance between points of the same cluster and a particular point which is the centre of that 
cluster. In contrast to the k-means algorithm, the k-medoids algorithm chooses points as centres that belong 
to the dataset. The most common implementation of the k-medoids clustering algorithm is Partitioning 
Around Medoids (PAM) algorithm. PAM algorithm uses a greedy search which may not find the global 
optimum solution. While medoids are more robust to outliers than centroids. However, they need more 
computation for high dimensional data. 
3.4 Hierarchical Clustering  
Hierarchal is an approach for clustering one data point in more than one clusters. In hierarchical cluster 
analysis, it is important to consider a few different linkage methods to identify which method appropriately 
clusters the data type such as single, complete, average linkage or Ward. The comparison between the above 
algorithms is summarized in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3 Clustering comparison 
Clustering name K-means Heretical clustering 
Advantages Assign each data point to 
exactly one cluster 
Simple 
Fast(usually scales linearly) 
Simple 
Can produce a tree for 
visualisation  
Disadvantages  Used Euclidean distance  
Don’t play well with non-liner 
data 
Need to specify a value for the 
number of clusters in advance  
Sensitive to noise and outlines  
Slow  
3.5 Why EM? 
When the class for each observation is unknown and estimation of them is target of clustering we can 
use the GMM model. GMM fitted via Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm has been used for model-
based clustering, classification, and density estimation, dimension reduction for visualisation-means and 
EM in the sense that each data point is assigned to a cluster, they perform the same step. In EM, significance 
of statistical distribution of variables in the dataset is the measure. Therefore, every point has a probability 
of being associated with every cluster. For this reason, it can be viewed as “fuzzy” approach to clustering. 
Moreover, both K-means and hierarchical clustering work on heuristic approach to build clusters, and do 
not rely on a formal model. Model-based clustering assumes a data model and applies an EM algorithm to 
find the most likely model components and the number of clusters.  
3.6 Obtaining and Dealing with Data  
Before embarking upon a statistical cluster analysis, there are certain data cleaning and data preparation 
steps that should be countered. The process of phase A and B are outlined in this section. The following 
steps are customized in fulfilment of the research objectives II to VI. 
 Data Collection: the first step needs to collect the malware hashes from various resources. 
 Data Preparation: the second step is to download the file and recognize unpacked malware samples. 
 Feature Extraction: raw source code extracts from each sample. 
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 Data Cleaning: filtering irrelevant information.  
 Feature Construction: the data even after cleaning are not ready for clustering as it needs to be 
constructed as variables. The basis variables used in the cluster detection algorithm should represent 
characteristics of malware samples.  
 Feature Selection: variables with little relationship to the target were excluded from the analysis. 
3.6.1 Data Collection 
Ideally, to work on datasets which are meaningful to our research aims, it was necessary to find and 
download samples consisting of various advanced malicious files. If data collect from standard repositories 
and comes from multiple families, it could build a robust model. For the sake of learning and practicing 
the various algorithms, there are a few websites available which provide academic or publicly available 
datasets. The researcher obtained a total of 500 samples from Kaggle, VirusTotal, VirusShare, Contagio 
and also FireEye. The samples were also evaluated through the peer review process by Virsutotal 
Intelligence platform.  
In phase A, collected malware hashes uploaded to www.virustotal.com to download their file. Virsutotal 
is a web interface which is a virus scan program integrated with several different antivirus engines into a 
single web interface. A large corpus of APTs downloaded in this way, see Figure 3-4. 
 
Figure 3-4Download process by Virsutotal Intelligence 
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An experiment has done in VMware. All malware were verified from Virsutotal and FireEye websites. 
3.6.2 Data Preparation  
Once datasets are collected. The next step is to find out unpacked files to have consistency in each sample 
datasets.  This evaluation is done by the usage of Exeinfo PE, see Figure 3-5.The next challenge was static 
analysis. 
 
Figure 3-5 Examine malware file 
3.6.3 Feature Extraction  
To capture the necessary opcode information is done by some static analysis that has been developed and 
ready to use, like IDA Pro 32/64. IDA Pro is included in best lists as claimed by statistical analysis 
launched by SAN institute. It used to disassemble a malware program into a sequence of machine 
instructions that are then used for feature extraction, see Figure 3-6. A portion of opcode generated by IDA 
Pro pointed in Figure 3-7. The gain information from this part is saved in an excel file for each individual 
malware sample. 
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Figure 3-6 Example Disassembly opcode 
 
Figure 3-7Static Analysis-IDA Pro 
All information collected during static analysis was compiled into a single database for each malware 
family.  
3.6.4 Data Cleaning 
The gain information from the previous stage contains opcode, instruction reference and also redundant 
data. Thus, all operands, labels, directives, etc. are discarded only retain the mnemonic opcode.  
Chunk of Opcode  
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The filtering process has been done by MATLAB script and a Macro in Excel file to generate static 
opcode sequence, visible in Figure 3-8 
 
Figure 3-8 Procedure of Data Cleaning 
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The obtained data from this step, it serves as a means to convert the capture opcode sequence into a raw 
dataset. 
3.6.5 Feature Construction  
Usually, there are thousands of rows (opcodes) representing individual malware type. As per research 
objective, it is necessary to understand and check source code relationships and links prior to running a data 
clustering technique. As it mentioned in section 2.5, Link Analysis tailors code instructions to opcode 
features. For this purpose, opcode sequence of each sample was captured and added to an individual 
repository for each family. Table 3-4 partically illustrates such a repository for class number one.  
Table 3-4 Opcode Sequence -Gatak Family 
 
To gain a better understanding of the relationship betweeen opcodes in the network, link analysis performed 
separately for each class, visible in Figure 3-9. 
 
Figure 3-9Shame of Link Analysis process diagram 
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Figure 3-10 Link Analysis process diagram 
  
After the run completes successfully, the results and generate valuable insights are available. The results 
view generates several outputs to allow us to explore the data, discover the associations and view them 
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graphically in a network graph, view multiple centrality measures as well as show scoring results, see 
Figure 3-11.Besides, Link Analysis node builds a full rule set (a network of opcode) and then prune to the 
most important rules. The visualizing the relationship between all opcode as items is reported in the 
separated window. 
 
Figure 3-11Sample Link Analysis output 
The reports revealed the associations, relationships, structures, and patterns among opcode sequence. 
Based on the association rules and centrality measure, a bunch of continuous variables produced. These 
variables consider as opcode features which mentioned below: 
opcode, weight, centr_degree_in, centr_degree_out, centr_degree, centr_close_wt, centr_close_in_wt, 
centr_close_out_wt, centr_close_unwt, centr_close_in_unwt, centr_close_out_unwt, centr_between_wt, 
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centr_between_unwt,centr_influence1_wt,centr_influence2_wt,centr_influence1_unwt,centr_influence2_
unwt, centr_cluster  
 
Figure 3-12Items Constellation Plot-Gatak sample Group 
In the new dataset, there is an apparent good mix of variables which explain the difference between the 
groups. Therefore, the primary dataset consists of N observations and 17 variables, see Table 3-5  
Table 3-5 Featuers names 
 
 The result measured the redundancy between variables which means that it can be beneficial as it can 
identify similarities among these observations. These attributes can be meaningful to segment and classify 
observations which are justified in section 5.1. 
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3.6.6 Feature Selection 
Prior to developing predictive models, it is recommended to exclude variables which are unnecessary or 
irrelevant to the stated dimensional reduction objective. Feature selection methods are normally used to 
reduce the number of features considered in a classification task by weeding out meaningless features. 
Thereupon, data segmentation analysis as a scalable feature selection method used for mining meaningful 
opcode features, refer to section 5.2. 
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Chapter Four 
Design and Implementation of Research 
Case Studies 
4 Overview 
This chapter explains the steps have been taken to complete the Link Analysis process. A sample of 500 
malware used to visualize and illustrate which equally divided into two case studies. Two malware datasets 
which consist of different malware types of known family used. The two case studies are outlined in details 
in sections 4.2 and 4.3. In both case studies, a similar process employed. A separate experiment is conducted 
for each of the malware datasets listed below: 
 Classifying Kaggle into families (Ramnit, Lollipop, Kelihos_ver3, Vundo, Simda, Tracur,                    
Kelihos_ver1, Obfuscator, and Gatak) 
 Classifying APTs into groups( APTs1,APTs28,APTs29,APTs30,APTs33) 
4.1 Opcode Mining  
Opcode structure extracted by utilizing static analysis via IDA Pro 32/64. Figure 4-1 exhibits part of source 
code. Disassemble samples were compiled into a single database for each malware family. The gain 
information contains opcode, instruction reference and also redundant data. Thus, all operands, labels, 
directives, etc. are discarded only retain the mnemonic opcodes. The filtering process has been done by 
MATLAB script and a Macro in Excel file to generate static opcode sequence. 
 
Figure 4-1Assembly code example generated by IDA-pro 
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As a case in point, the static opcode sequence corresponding to the example in Figure 4-1 is: 
call, push, lea, push, push, call, add, test, jz 
The obtained data from this step serves as a means to convert the capture opcode dataset into a raw dataset. 
Thus, all sequences of opcodes of each family inserted as observation into a CSV file. This way it will be 
easier to turn it into vectors since data mining algorithms work by performing computation on vectors. 
4.2 Kaggle Case Study 
A free set provided by Microsoft for a competition is used.  Kaggle datasets are widely used for research 
and studies on malware. This dataset constructed a collection of nine families which contains about 10,000 
labelled data instances in total. The size dataset is enormous, therefore a smaller subset randomly is chosen 
for faster evaluation of the proposed approach 
4.2.1 Dataset Characteristics and Pre-processing  
This dataset constructed a collection of nine malware families. A brief description of each class is provided 
below according to the Microsoft threat intelligence archive: 
 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/research/antimalware-security-research-papers. 
 Gatak (class 1) is a spyware usually hidden in key generators (a piece of software generating product 
activation key, usually created by hackers) or as an update to the regular application. 
 Kelihos_ver1 (class 2) is a Trojan and a spam bot. It usually sends messages containing links leading 
to a virus installer. Some versions of this malware also capture sensitive data about the user, therefore 
it can be classified as spyware as well. 
 Kelihos_ver3 (class 3) is just another version of Kelihos_ver1described above. Its functionality is 
similar, it is just a different implementation.  
 Lollipop (class 4) is an adware which shows ads in the browsers. In addition, it often monitors the 
activities of the user via search engines. It is usually distributed as a browser add-in with some third-
party software. It affects all main browsers: Fire-fox, Microsoft Internet Explorer and Google 
Chrome.  
 Obfuscator (class 5) is, as the name suggests, a tool for hiding other malware from being discovered 
by antivirus and antispyware software. The hidden malware can be any-thing. This makes this 
category very hard to detect.  
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 Ramnit (class 6) is a spyware trying to steal financial, banking and social accounts from the PC. 
Moreover, it disables all Microsoft Windows security features (antivirus, firewall, and User account 
control).  
 Simda (class 7) is a Trojan and a spyware. It steals your passwords and sends them to virus creator.  
 Tracur (class 8) is a Trojan adware redirecting your searches to advertisement pages. It can 
download other malware as well. Some implementations are even creating back door for a hacker, 
thereupon they can take over a system. 
 Vundo (class 9) is an adware and a virus. Additionally, it shows unrequested pop-up ads and 
downloads other malware and installs it on the system too. 
Once opcode excels sheets of each family is generated, it would be ready to feed into SAS.It can be 
seen from Table 4-1 that the number of rows (opcodes) that belong to each class is different. 
Table 4-1Kaggle raw dataset 
Family Name Number of Opcode Sequence 
Gatak 136465 
KelihosV-1 38797 
KelihosV-3 43533 
Lolipop 895597 
Obfuscator 343722 
Ramint 1000000 
Smida 67836 
Tracur 184399 
Vundo 56445 
4.2.2 Experimental Set up and Reports 
In what follows, the focus will be less on the details of the mathematical algorithms used and more on the 
visual interpretation of the outcomes. In the figure that appears in the next page the processing completes. 
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Figure 4-1 Link Analysis process diagram 
One of the powerful advantages of link analysis is to convert association and/or sequence rules into network 
graphs. Each link chart designs according to centrality measures computation. Clustering algorithms could 
be developed by using these centrality measures-namely degree, betweenness, closeness, and eighnvector 
(Liu et al., 2014). Centrality measure qualifies how important a node is in the association community. It 
provides information about which variables are meaningful. These variables will be passed as inputs to the 
variable clustering node in order to select interesting variables associate with each group. These variables 
formed as raw dataset in MS Excel format and then it uploaded into variable clustering node. Potentially 
useful features will be pulled out which enhance segmentation of clustering. Part of these variables is shown 
in Table 4-2.
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As the Figure 4-2 illustrated link analysis produced interesting differentiation among the groups. Interesting 
means different forms of link maps which present relationships and connections in opcodes. 
 
Figure 4-2Link Analysis Windows Output -Kaggle Dataset 
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Gatak windows output is provided in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3Gatak windows output  
Extracted calculation of centrality measure can be accessible by reports, see Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 Variables in the Kaggle dataset 
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The result of each class analysed carefully and structured meaningful features for next step which is data 
segmentation analysis. 
 
Figure 4-4 Gatak distribution Opcode weight 
The node weight of an opcode is the frequency of it. Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 simply illustrate which 
opcode is the most popular in two different families.  
To give an example, ,cmp,jnb,jnz,jz,lea,mov,or,pop,push,sub,and xor are the most popular opcode with 
weight of 15 in Gatak family. On contrary, fcom,fld,punpc,ror,setnl,setnz are unpopular with lowest weight  
of 2.  
Node=xchg 
Weight =47 
 
61 
 
i i 
 
Figure 4-5 KelihosV-1 distribution Opcode weight 
From the thickness of the link, the most frequent opcode can be seen. Link Analysis node provides a very 
powerful visualization of Opcode-malware relations, visible in Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7. 
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Figure 4-6 Lolipop Opcode Network 
cmp node the height weight =15 
ror node the low weight =2 
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Figure 4-7 KelihosV-1 Opcode Network 
The plot gives association graphs among opcode nodes. For more specific data, if a single node or a 
pattern of node to node linkages is “interesting” the investigator can select one or more nodes for further 
reporting. Figure visualized a single opcode ‘cmp’ with its neighbours. The size of nodes represent the 
support of opcode and the thickness of the link represents association strength between opcode. 
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Figure 4-8 Links among selection, Constellation ‘cmp’ 
Graph based visualization sketches the weight of the nodes and links which represent features vectors as it 
showed in Table 4-2.Two malicious codes are judged to be similar to each other according to the association 
support and minimum confidence.  Furthermore, sequence discovery presented based on order opcode 
orders. The Rules Table displays information about each rule that was generated – the Support, Confidence 
and Lift, as well as the number of occurrences and the items in each rule. Which rules have the highest 
Support is matter in terms of knowledge discovery process. Figure illustrated the association rule for Gatak 
family, and part of rules yields the following Table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-3 Sample rules from Gatak family analysis 
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Since these values are different from one family to another one and such can be expressed as follows, see 
Figure 4-9. 
 
Figure 4-9Rule statistics-Gatak family 
 
Rule ID=1 
Transaction count =51 
Rule=jnz==>or 
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Sample exploratory plot of opcode ‘cmp’ is visible in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4-10 Opcode constellation plot for ‘cmp’ 
A few outliers in the data spotted in each plot, example provided in Figure 4-11. 
 
Figure 4-11 Relationship between cmp and other opcode based on rules 
Finally, extracted weight centrality measures values is built Kaggle primary datasets. 
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Figure 4-12Kaggle Primarily dataset in RStudio 
Additional reports are available in appendix A .These reports used interactively, nodes and kinks to 
provide more detailed information. 
4.3 APTs Case Study 
For current experiments, the primarily focus is on five dominant APTs groups, namely, group number 1, 
28, 29, 30, and 33. A collection of malware samples from each group is 50 files. This is first collection of 
APTs samples which is available now for other researcher. Hashes of APTs group number 1 retrieved from 
VirusShare https://virusshare.com/torrents.4n6, see Figure 4-13, other hashes were collected from FireEye 
cyber threat intelligence reports. FireEye is an American company regularly publishes cyber threat 
intelligence reports that include hashes of APT groups https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/threat-
intelligence-reports.html.All corpus of APTs downloaded from VirustotalIntelligence. This is first time 
APTs samples were collected from different groups for research purpose. The dataset is available on 
GitHub. 
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Figure 4-13APT1 hash dataset 
4.3.1 Dataset Characteristics and Pre-processing 
Standard APTs groups according to FireEye is used in the research.A number of observations associated 
with each family presents in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4.APTs raw dataset 
Group Name Number of  Opcode Observation 
APTs1 244098 
APTs28 1964498 
APTs29 529931 
APTs30 391935 
APTs33 1000000 
4.3.2 Experimental set up and Reports 
The experiment setup for is the same as in the previous section. Link Analysis process diagram is shown 
below: 
 
Figure 4-14APTs Link Analysis process diagram-APTs 
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After running the link analysis node, a variety of standard graphs can be displayed. The result of this 
model is illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 4-15Link Analysis windows output- APTs dataset 
The delivered weighted links and nodes from each APT family is presented in following pages (from 
Figure 4-16 to Figure 4-20.) 
  
 
70 
 
i i 
 
Figure 4-16 opcode Network -APT1 
 
Figure 4-17 Opcode Network-APT28 
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Figure 4-18Opcode Network-APT29 
 
Figure 4-19 Opcode Network-APT30 
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Figure 4-20Opcode Network-APT33 
Once all the above processing has been completed, the primary dataset was uploaded into SAS for feature 
engineering purpose. Additional reports are available in appendix B. These reports used interactively, 
nodes and kinks to provide more detailed information. 
4.4 Summary 
With prepared primarily dataset of each case study we intended to identify whether constructed features can 
be segmented meaningfully in the view of malware classification. This objective successfully achieved by 
usage of variable clustering and segmentation algorithms in SAS.  
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Chapter Five 
Models Assessment for Feature 
Engineering  
5 Overview  
In this section, the performance of feature construction and selection models are investigated. To 
illustrate the usefulness of these models in feature engineering, we selected segmentation analysis and 
Gaussian Mixer Model. The performances are evaluated based which will be discussed further. 
5.1 Validity of the Feature Construction Model 
Ultimately, link analysis, like any data mining analysis, needs to prove its value as a feature construction 
method. To examine the efficiency and effectiveness of this method for malware classification 
segmentation analysis are used. Segmentation strategy across all dimensions execute and analyse the 
extracted feature relationships. In the context of business data mining, segmentation analysis has been 
applied for marketing or customer contact strategy(Y. Liu et al., 2014) .The unlabelled data is partitioned 
correctly by this prediction method. Suppose a dataset consists of n malicious samples, the partitioning 
method construct k partition and k < n. It means that it will classify the malicious sample into k group, in 
a way that each group contains at least one sample. Beside, each malware must belong to exactly one 
group. The following diagrams created to represent clusters or segments, see Figure 5-1. 
A common strategy prior to developing clusters or predictive models is to reduce the number of variables 
to a more manageable uncorrelated, non-redundant set. Finding interesting regularities in large malware 
datasets is can be possible by using decision Tree methodology. The segmentation analysis attempts to 
evaluate the overall value or importance of the variable over the fitted tree. For instance, if variable A has 
a variable importance higher than variable B then variable A can be said to have a larger impact on the 
clustering model. Keeping track of where each observation was placed and how each cluster is expanding 
can be achievable by variable clustering and segmentation techniques. The aim is to segregate groups with 
similar traits and assign them into clusters. 
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Figure 5-1Segmentation process diagram for both case studies  
  Segment Profile node scans clustered data and pulls out the factors that differentiate data segments 
(clusters/groups) from the population reflects the finding of the author(Thompson, 2008). As specified to 
the relationships between variables and observations in a dataset; objects will be grouped. The 
segmentation node selected nine clusters in Kaggle primary data and five in APTs primary data as seen in 
the segment size pie chart of Figure 5-2.  
  
Figure 5-2 Segment Size: Cluster window generated by Segment Profile Node 
Referring to Figure 4-2 and also Figure 4-15  a significant difference between families can be seen. A group 
of partitioning clustering algorithms is used to partition a data set of n objects with 17 features into 9 groups 
for Kaggle, 5 groups for APTs. The results indicate the ‘correct’ number of clusters correctly in both case 
studies. The figure shows the distribution of Kaggle observation based on first two weight centrality 
measurement features. Once an observation has been included in a cluster, it cannot be reassigned. The pie 
char can be scaled by count or by percentage of the segment population. 
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Summary of segment: 
 
Segmentation analysis in SAS is based on factor analysis. It can perfume two methods to determine which 
variables can be employed to differentiate among segments. The first method works on binning the input 
variable to identify their maximum log-worth which is known as ‘variable worth’. Another one creates a 
Decision Tree to predict the segments from the inputs and use the Tree methodology of assessing ‘variable 
importance’. The first step is to form groups of attributes that express some sort of common theme. The 
number of factors is determined using a combination of statistics and knowledge of the category. Once the 
number of factors has been calculated, each respondent receives a score for each of the factors. Respondents 
are then assigned to the factor that has the highest score. Results of segmentation analysis create a subset of 
“important” features and find “meaningfully” related features among malware families. Partial results of 
factor segmentation classification are shown in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1  Kaggle cluster metrics 
 
The segmentation process used to select the best subset of opcodes sequence. To deal with high 
dimensionality, only variables with the highest score used in the secondary dataset.  Segment Profile results 
with aligned reporting variables exhibit in Variables (segment vs overall) are displayed horizontally in 
descending order of importance for each segment/cluster. The distribution charts are displayed for the most 
significant variables in each segment, which can be different for each. The columns are well ordered from 
left to right according to their ability to discriminate that segment from the population. The green shaded 
region represents the within-segment distribution. The orange outline represents the population distribution.  
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Figure 5-3 Segment Profile Distribution 
As can be seen from the plat the following five variables have been chosen: _center_influencel_unwt, 
_center_close_in_wt, _center_dgree,_center_close_unwt,_center_between_wt. It is the above bar graph that 
highest worth variable is _center_influencel_unwt, and the lowest is _center_between_wt. The present 
finding reflects in the following pages (Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5) 
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Figure 5-4Segment Profile Outputs -Kaggle Segment 
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Figure 5-5 Segment Profile Outputs - Kaggle Segment 
The output shows the decision tree results of importance for the variable by each segment. The variables 
which have been grouped together show obvious similarity relationships. The similarity relationships 
provide a very good idea of which variables are dominant in the Ramnit segment. The variable importance 
in the Segment Profile node is based on the relationship to the Segment variable. When the depth of the 
decision tree used to differentiate among variables is 1, the ‘variable worth’ is used to rank the variables. If 
not, ‘variable importance’ is used the rank the variables. A comparison of the outputs is furnished the 
variables sub set that can sufficiently help to build cluster and predictive model. These variables can be 
segmented various type of malware that has similar opcode structure in each family. From here, the 
important variables are pulled out which separate each individual malware family by their worth variables. 
The following shows worth variables chart of APTs dataset (from Figure 5-6 to Figure 5-10). 
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Figure 5-6 Segment Value-APT29 
 
 
Figure 5-7 Segment Value-APT1 
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Figure 5-8 Segment Value-APT33 
 
 
Figure 5-9 Segment Value-APT28 
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Figure 5-10Segment Value-APT30 
As can be seen from the plat the following ten variables have been chosen: _center_influencel2_wt 
,_center_influencel2_unwt, _center_close_in_wt, _center_dgree,_center_close_wt,_center_between_unwt.  
_centr_close_wt ,_centr_between_unwt , center_influencel1_unwt, _centr_degree_out , _centr_degree_in 
will constructed the final APT dataset. 
Summarization  Kaggle class distribution generated by data segmentation node is presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Class Distribution in Secondary Kaggle Dataset 
 
There is slight difference between the class distributions in actual vs secondary dataset, see Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3 Class Distribution in Actual Kaggle Dataset 
 
Following this procedure, a target dataset for testing classification performance is constructed in an Excel 
file for each dataset. 
5.2 Validity of the Feature Selection Model 
Validation of feature selection performance it can be a difficult task. There are multiple methods to 
understand the goodness of the proposed model for clustering task. To test how well the segmentation 
model partitioned malware observation, Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is employed. It utilized to 
determine that selected features inherent to malware families are interesting features. The mixture models 
not only can estimate the density function but also can provide a probabilistic clustering of the observed 
data i (i = 1, ..., n) into k clusters. Gaussian model is developed on the Bayesian theory (Tree theory) which 
is based on counting the relative occurrences of observations. K-fold cross-validation is measure too. The 
result of it shows the discriminant analysis based on Gaussian finite mixture modelling. Gaussian finite 
mixture model fitted by EM algorithm is run. In the following steps we shall show how GMM operations 
split the final set of distribution. SAS will not implement model-based clustering algorithms. With R, 
Mclust package loaded and the final Kaggle dataset is imported in R as shown in Figure 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-11 Number of Observation of Kaggle dataset 
The model-based clustering performed on primary and final Kaggle dataset, visible in Figure 5-12 and 
Figure 5-13.  
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Figure 5-12 Classification Model on Primary Kaggle Dataset 
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Figure 5-13 Classification model on final Kaggle dataset 
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To select which log-likelihoods should be used, the function Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is 
run. According to BIC from Mclust (R package) for the 6 available model parameterizations and up to 9 
clusters for the Kaggle dataset. Different symbols and line types encode different model parameterizations. 
The ‘best’ model is taken to be the one with the highest BIC among the fitted models. The resulting plot 
is shown in Figure 5-14. 
 
Figure 5-14 BIC values and plot for models fitted to Kaggle data 
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A summary of the selected model is obtained as: 
 
 
Each component is the mixture is what we call a cluster. Mclust uses an identifier for each possible 
parametrization of the covariance matrix that has three letters: E for “equal”, V for “variable” and I for 
“coordinate axes. The summary is showing the top models are VEV and VVV. Estimation model 
complexity by the BIC determined VEV is the best model, visible Figure 5-15. 
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Figure 5-15 Extracted VEV from BIC 
BIC fit models with all K of interest and choose the one with largest BIC. Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
classifier may not be properly separated as the dataset too small. However, the outcome of clustering 
method validate true number of Kaggle dataset. Cluster may be separated but surrounded, see Figure 5-16. 
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Figure 5-16 Classification of Kaggle Dataset 
The error in detection was measured as the root mean squared difference between actual and detected 
number of clusters in the data. Mismatch between the two can be result from small number of dataset, see 
Figure 5-17.  
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Figure 5-17Error Distribution 
Estimation the optimal number of clusters depicted in Figure 5-18. This estimation determined the number 
of cluster in Kaggle dataset based on gap statistic model. According to this observation, it is possible to 
define N=9 as the optimal number of cluster in the data based on segmentation results. 
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Figure 5-18 Optimal number of Kaggle Clusters 
5.3 Discussion  
A classification-based approach is presented by using common-factor analytic mixture models. 
Segmentation analysis attempts to identify significant opcode features of malware types in different families 
and also to predict group. How to select informative features from more than two classes is explored and 
examined. SAS Enterprise Miner provides a very powerful visualization of opcode relations. The results 
showed that the Link Analysis technique for the variable constructor is an efficient method from a feature 
engineering technique perspective. The key features within a cluster which present high similarity or 
correlation extracted by segment analysis. Our experimental results show that the combination of link 
analysis and data segmentation analysis in features engineering can be used to cluster malware families with 
a small penalty. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
6 Overview 
In this chapter discussing the research objectives and lessons learned are presented. The research results 
offer an attractive feature selection model a means to reduce feature dimension with an adaptable and 
scalable data mining techniques. The method shows to give excellent classification performance on Kaggle 
and APTs malware datasets. 
6.1 Research objectives revisited  
The aim of this research was to better understand feature selection by using the concept of data mining 
to uncover unknown patterns of advanced malware which can be used as a classification technique. This 
work is very much inspired by the opcode mining technique. Link Analysis as a powerful data mining 
technique is used to discover useful associations and sequences hidden in opcode structures. Segment 
analysis can utilize link analysis result to discover interesting and similar patterns in one group. 
Previous studies relied on n-gram, opcode frequency or sequence patterns whereas we utilized 
association rule mining to determine opcode hidden patterns in one malware family. To examine the 
difference between each malware groups, link analysis was conducted. We used opcode weights to 
calculate the prevalence of opcode observations to test for segmentation clustering. To avoid redundant 
rules, we used segmentation analysis. These rules can automatically form a different type of malware to 
the respective family if they feed to the training stage. 
The Link Analysis rules satisfy some evaluation criterion of family classification. It can be used for 
creating new derived variables to use in feature construction techniques. Then, tree-based dimensional 
reduction techniques as such segmentation analysis are used to find the promising features. 
 
93 
 
i i 
Due to sophisticated techniques, static analysis is performed on malware samples to reveal their intended 
behaviour, which was hidden (Bilar, 2007). Additionally, this method provides more meaningful features 
for detection purpose compare with  behaviour analysis approach(Cosovan, Benchea and Gavrilut, 2015). 
Most existing rule inductive learning algorithms have been developed based on single rule evaluation 
measures. Research results indicate that Link Analysis method has led to a desirable number of families 
based on segmentation analysis. This model of feature engineering is developed based on the 
characteristics of malicious files and code instructions. It is strongly believed that this research will lead 
to further research and new detection techniques for polymorphic and metamorphic malware, prior to 
execution or transmission. 
6.2 Recommendation and Future Work 
Future work should entail evaluating network analysis of malware families to better assess attribution and 
intrinsic relationships that may exist. Some useful next steps to this type of analysis include adding an 
observation of a significant relationship. The relationships between rules in a set are complicated. There 
are many conditions need to be considered. Measures investigate the subjective aspect of rule 
interestingness or significant pattern can be considered for further work. Besides, increase the performance 
of the clustering is another objective. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  Segmentation Profile Node Report-Kaggle 
 
Frequencies: _group 
  
                                       Percent of 
Segment     Segment       Frequency       Total 
Variable    Value           Count       Frequency 
  
 _group     Ramnit              52       18.3746 
 _group     Tracur              47       16.6078 
 _group     Gatak               38       13.4276 
 _group     Simda               38       13.4276 
 _group     Vundo               36       12.7208 
 _group     Lolipop             31       10.9541 
 _group     Obfuscator          21        7.4205 
 _group     KelihosV_1          10        3.5336 
 _group     KelihosV_3          10        3.5336 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Ramnit Count: 52 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.27233      1 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.24387      2 
_centr_degree             0.16460      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.09183      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.04828      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Tracur Count: 47 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_degree             0.16978      1 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.08682      2 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.07389      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.03446      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.01051      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Gatak Count: 38 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                    Worth     Rank 
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_centr_close_in_wt        0.083503      1 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.080400      2 
_centr_degree             0.057014      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.033149      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.004634      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Simda Count: 38 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.17166      1 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.08586      2 
_centr_degree             0.03084      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.03067      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.00904      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Vundo Count: 36 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.11885      1 
_centr_degree             0.07602      2 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.06236      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.05760      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.00947      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Lolipop Count: 31 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_degree             0.10151      1 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.07562      2 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.07305      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.02801      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.02173      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: Obfuscator Count: 21 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                    Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_degree             0.083687      1 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.027060      2 
_centr_close_unwt         0.023447      3 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.017557      4 
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_centr_between_wt         0.005840      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: KelihosV_1 Count: 10 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                    Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_degree             0.047982      1 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.010275      2 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.007999      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.007001      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.002654      5 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: KelihosV_3 Count: 10 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                    Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_degree             0.048740      1 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.027410      2 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.025877      3 
_centr_close_unwt         0.018145      4 
_centr_between_wt         0.006611      5 
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Appendix B: Segmentation Profile Node Report-APTs 
Frequencies: _group 
  
                                    Percent of 
Segment     Segment    Frequency       Total 
Variable     Value       Count       Frequency 
  
 _group      APT28           44       32.5926 
 _group      APT33           26       19.2593 
 _group      APT29           25       18.5185 
 _group      APT1            22       16.2963 
 _group      APT30           18       13.3333 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: APT28 Count: 44 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
       Variable            Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_close_in_unwt      0.43940      1 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.43940      2 
_centr_close_out_unwt     0.43940      3 
_centr_close_out_wt       0.43940      4 
_centr_close_unwt         0.43940      5 
_centr_close_wt           0.43940      6 
_centr_influence2_wt      0.42643      7 
_centr_degree_out         0.27233      8 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.24858      9 
_centr_influence2_unwt    0.23344     10 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: APT33 Count: 26 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence2_wt      0.31100      1 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.29830      2 
_centr_influence2_unwt    0.29753      3 
_centr_degree             0.28511      4 
_centr_degree_out         0.26903      5 
_centr_degree_in          0.26257      6 
_centr_close_wt           0.23503      7 
_centr_cluster            0.23396      8 
_centr_close_out_wt       0.23119      9 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.22109     10 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: APT29 Count: 25 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
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_centr_influence2_wt      0.27452      1 
_centr_degree             0.21035      2 
_centr_degree_out         0.20070      3 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.19637      4 
_centr_close_out_wt       0.19637      5 
_centr_close_wt           0.19637      6 
_centr_cluster            0.17903      7 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.17490      8 
_centr_degree_in          0.16511      9 
_centr_close_out_unwt     0.16447     10 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: APT1 Count: 22 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence2_wt      0.24571      1 
_centr_influence2_unwt    0.21405      2 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.19313      3 
_centr_degree_out         0.16819      4 
_centr_close_out_wt       0.15450      5 
_centr_close_out_unwt     0.15202      6 
_centr_degree             0.14849      7 
_centr_degree_in          0.14841      8 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.14407      9 
_centr_close_wt           0.14407     10 
  
  
  
Variable: _group Segment: APT30 Count: 18 
Decision Tree Importance Profiles 
  
Variable                   Worth     Rank 
  
_centr_influence2_wt      0.23111      1 
_centr_influence2_unwt    0.21708      2 
_centr_close_in_wt        0.19930      3 
_centr_close_out_wt       0.19619      4 
_centr_close_wt           0.19619      5 
_centr_degree_in          0.18111      6 
_centr_between_unwt       0.16531      7 
_centr_influence1_unwt    0.16208      8 
_centr_degree_out         0.15915      9 
_centr_degree             0.15726     10 
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